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ABSTRACT 
The United States Army is entering a period of strategic reset after more than a decade of intense 
combat operations.  One of the most critical areas of this reset is ensuring the health and discipline of 
the force remains intact.  There are factors, both health and discipline, which drive high-risk behaviors 
by soldiers.  Therefore it is critical to understand if the system is adequately structured in order 
adequately prepare leaders to not only ensure soldiers complete their work functions, but also maintain 
a healthy personal life.   
Leadership and solder welfare systems are the primary drivers of this research.  The research explores 
how leaders ensure soldier well-being in a garrison environment and identifies some of the structural 
causes for the difficulties in achieving this.  It attempts to holistically analyze both how the system is 
designed, but also its implementation and the properties which emerge from it.   
The research first outlines Army doctrine to establish the baseline for how the Army operates.  Next, it 
identifies a series of policies and processes which relate directly to soldier welfare to identify the 
structure in which leaders operate.  At the same time this develops the framework to identify how the 
system operates through a series of interviews with leaders at the company level in order identify the 
perspective of leaders at the company level and some of the emergent behaviors which evolve from the 
design of the system.  In conclusion, this research determines that a multi-leveled approach must be 
taken.  Senior leaders must ensure the system is designed to foster the development of leaders and 
provides flexibility to these leaders.  Leaders at the company level must not only prioritize short-term 
operational goals, but also invest in people for the long-term viability of the Army.   
Thesis Supervisor: Jayakanth Srinivasan 
Title: Research Scientist, Behavioral and Policy Sciences Division, Sloan School of Management 
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Chapter 1 
“The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. 
They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. 
Either case is a failure of leadership.”   
- General (Ret.) Colin Powell1 
1.1 Overview 
The Army is currently entering a stage of strategic reset.  Following the completion of the war in Iraq 
and the current drawdown in Afghanistan, the Army must prepare itself for future operations.  With 
this, the Army will return to a garrison centric Army, with a significant decrease in the number of 
deployed soldiers.  This reset to ensure personnel and equipment readiness will occur in the shadow of 
budget constraints and reduction of force levels throughout the Department of Defense.  One of the 
most critical aspects of the reset is the health and discipline of the Army’s personnel.  Health and 
discipline may be considered separate entities, yet often they are often intertwined.  For example, a 
soldier suffering from depression (health), may commit a crime (discipline) partially driven by the 
absence of treatment.    The Army must be successful in this endeavor to ensure the readiness of the 
force.     
1.1.1 Health of Force 
When considering the health of the force, there are both mental and physical factors which must be 
accounted for.  The Army has seen an increase in the prevalence rates of mental disorder diagnoses 
since 2000.  These have nearly doubled from 2000 to 2009, likely due to increased combat and improved 
screening and diagnoses.  (U.S Army, 2012, Generating Health and Discipline of the Force (HDF))  Some 
of these issues are combat related, and some are not.  Two common health problems relating to combat 
are Post Traumatic Stress, which has been estimated at over 400,000 former combat veterans and over 
200,000 soldiers as of September 2011. (U.S Army, 2012, HDF)  Additionally, mild traumatic brain injury 
(mTBI) has also been a major health concern for the Army.  A significant number of injuries in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were blast-related and the number of soldiers identified with traumatic brain injuries in the 
from over 4,000 in 2000 to over 18,000 in 2010.  (U.S Army, 2012, HDF).  These injuries can lead to 
emotional, behavioral or cognitive symptoms for the soldier.   
                                                          
1
 Accessed 9 May 2013 from:  http://govleaders.org/powell.htm 
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There are also a series of conditions which may occur, regardless of combat experience or not.  
Although, Post Traumatic Stress and mTBI are most often related to combat, there is also potential for 
these to occur outside of combat.  For example post-traumatic stress may occur in any traumatic event 
such as an accident, and mTBI has become a major topic of discussion in the National Football League 
due to repetitive collisions of players and its impact on their brains.  (Forbes, 2013)  Another major 
disorder is depression, which may be more difficult to identify.  Depression is not a problem unique to 
the military, as a 2012 study showed that 6.6% and 8.3% of the American population have had a Major 
Depressive Episode in the previous year. (Mental Health Services Administration, 2011) Due to that, it 
likely also affects a large portion of soldiers, some diagnosed, and some undiagnosed.  Another study of 
veterans entering the VA found that 14% were diagnosed with depression.  (National Alliance on Mental 
Illness, 2008)  Depression often leads to another health disorder, although often viewed as a disciplinary 
issue, substance abuse.  In 2011, there were 24,000 soldiers referred to the Army Substance Abuse 
Program (ASAP), and over 7,000 were separated from service for drug related misconduct. (U.S Army, 
2012, HDF)   
Another health related factor which must be accounted for is stress.  While some stress may be 
beneficial, an overwhelming amount may lead to exhaustion and a decrease in well-being.  (U.S Army, 
2012, HDF)  There are multiple strands of stressors the Army identifies.  These are the unit, the soldier, 
and the family strands.  The unit stressors revolve around the unit timeline.  These include pre-
deployment training, deployments, redeployments, and reset.  These are obviously stressful times for 
soldiers.  The soldier strand focuses on the professional side of a soldier.  Some stressors include 
evaluations, disciplinary actions, injuries, and promotions/demotions.  The final strand is family, but 
more generally, it focuses on the soldier’s personal life.  These include marriages, divorces, children, 
large purchases, or other personal issues.  (U.S Army, 2012, HDF)  Combining these strands, it can be 
easy to see how they can combine to create periods of intense stress in a soldier’s life, ultimately 
leading to other issues.    
1.1.2 Discipline of the Force 
To accompany these health issues, many develop into disciplinary problems, although not all disciplinary 
problems are driven by health issues.  Some are simply a function of poor decision making or the failure 
to meet established standards due to misplaced priorities.  The most serious issue the Army faces with 
indiscipline is crime.  In 2011, it is estimated that criminal activity and high-risk behavior have limited the 
readiness of 2.6% of soldiers in the Army In FY11, there were over 78,000 criminal offenses, including 
violent and non-violent felonies and misdemeanors.  (U.S Army, 2012, HDF).    
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These crimes have an obvious impact to the readiness of the force and its ability to reset after many 
years of combat.  The first impact is on the soldier which commits the crime.  The individual is no longer 
able to perform many of the duties required during the investigations, trials, and punishment periods.  
This leaves the unit short and others must assume the duties of the individual until they return to 
normal duty or are replaced.  If there were crimes committed against others in the unit, it is possible to 
have a fracturing of the cohesion and trust within the unit.  Finally, many hours of leaders and other 
soldiers may be required in the situation.  Multiple reports and administrative tasks must be completed 
following a crime and therefore this consumes the time of others within the unit to manage these tasks.   
1.2 Purpose 
Leaders are responsible for the readiness and the welfare of their organizations.  Much of the day to day 
prevention, identification, mitigation, and response tasks must be performed at the lowest level.  This 
introduces an interesting dynamic.  The first line supervisors of the most at risk population of soldiers, is 
also the least experienced and “seasoned leaders”.  These leaders are thought to be requirement for 
leadership in garrison. (U.S. Army, 2010)  These leaders have a profound impact on soldiers and their 
behavior.  Ultimately, the Army must impact the actions of these leaders if it expects leadership to have 
a role in ensuring the health and well-being of the force.   
 
Senior leaders in the Army have identified “atrophied garrison leadership skills” as a critical driver in 
soldier high-risk behavior. (U.S. Army, 2010)  Much of the decrease in leader ability is due to the high 
operational tempo, and the focus on combat readiness and tactical ability.  The some of the garrison 
leadership skills the Army has identified as lost are “unannounced health and welfare checks in the 
barracks accompanied by Military Police Working Dog sweeps, unannounced 100% urinalysis tests, 
privately owned vehicle(POV)/motorcycle safety inspections, counseling, ceremonies and accountability 
formations”.  (U.S. Army, 2010)  
 
While there have been recommendations to improve professional education to ensure skills are being 
developed and many of the processes mentioned above have been implemented, there is still the 
requirement to develop leaders at the company level and there are secondary effects to the 
implementation of many of the processes considered as part of “garrison leadership”.  (U.S. Army, 2010) 
This research will systematically look at leadership at the company level to determine how leaders are 
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able to identify at-risk soldiers, and prevent, mitigate, and respond to high-risk events.  It will also 
identify some of the challenges leaders face, internal and external to the company.  Finally, it will 
provide recommendations for to assist leaders in ensuring the well-being and discipline of soldiers, and 
ultimately the future readiness of the Army.   
1.3 Research Methodology 
This research will systematically approach the problem of ensuring soldier welfare.  Chapter two will 
provide an overview of Army doctrine and the company level programs which operate within the larger 
doctrinal context.  Chapter three develops the theoretical framework for analysis of the problem and 
develops a semi-structured interview.  Ten company level leaders were interviewed from the ranks of 
Staff Sergeant to Captain.  Chapter four is a description of the results of the interviews.  Chapter five is a 
causal loop diagram, attempting to understand the higher order effects of important policy decisions.  
Chapter six will be recommendations for improvements to the current system.  Finally, chapter seven 
will be the conclusion.   
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Chapter 2 
In order to fully understand the problem a better understanding of a company and what is done with 
respect to the prevention, identification, mitigation, and response to high-risk soldiers. This chapter will 
first describe what a company is and how it is structured.  It will then discuss where the company sits 
within the larger enterprise.  The next part will discuss Army doctrine establish a baseline for a common 
understanding of the established principles throughout the Army.  Finally, the paper will describe some 
of the critical programs and systems the company level which will have impacts in the prevention, 
identification, mitigation and response stages.   
2.1 The Company 
The primary unit of analysis will be the U.S. Army company.  A company is able to independently 
conduct its battlefield function and is comprised of approximately 60-200 soldiers which are divided 
among three to four platoons.  The specific size and composition of each company depends on its 
battlefield function (i.e. Infantry, Transportation, Armor, etc.), but the general structure remains the 
same.  The company, which may also be called a troop or battery, depending on the type of unit is 
commanded by a Captain (O-3). (Operational Unit Diagrams Website)  Command is defined as: 
 
The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over 
subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.  Command includes the authority and 
responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment 
of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the 
accomplishment assigned mission.  It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, 
morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002) 
 
The company commander is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do.  Commanders 
cannot accomplish every task for their unit, and therefore responsibilities are divided out to 
subordinates within the unit, but must hold those individuals responsible.  (U.S. Army, 2008) 
 
The senior non-commissioned officer at the company level is a First Sergeant (E-8).  First sergeants assist 
the commander in many of the critical administrative tasks, but more importantly are responsible for 
training and the health and welfare of the soldiers within the unit.  As the senior non-commissioned 
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officer within the unit, he is the senior trainer of soldiers and leaders and is responsible for the 
professional development of enlisted soldiers within the command.  (U.S. Army, 2002) 
 
The company commander and first sergeant are part of the company headquarters which is also 
comprised of a few soldiers who assist in administrative activities.   
2.1.1 The Platoon 
The company is comprised of three to four platoons and conducts operations as part of the company 
plan.  It consists of 16-44 soldiers and is broken down into two to four sections.  Similar to the company 
commander’s role in the company, the platoon leader, a first or second lieutenant (O-2 or O-1) is 
responsible for everything the platoon does or fails to do.   His enlisted counterpart is the platoon 
sergeant, normally a sergeant first class (E-7).  The platoon sergeant’s responsibilities are similar to the 
first sergeant.  The platoon sergeant assists the platoon leader and advises the platoon leader, who 
often has many years less experience in the military.  Ultimately, the platoon sergeant is responsible for 
the training of individuals and squads.  (Operational Unit Diagrams Website)   
2.1.2 The Squad 
The squad is the smallest unit within the Army.  Squads consist of 8 – 16 Soldiers.  These units are 
typically led by staff sergeants (E-6).  These leaders are the front line leaders for a majority of the junior 
soldiers (E-1 thru E-4).  They are responsible for the health, welfare and safety of these Soldiers and acts 
as their primary trainer.  The leadership provided by the staff sergeant is critical in providing a positive 
role model for these junior soldiers.  (Operational Unit Diagrams Website)   
2.1.3 The Company within the Larger Enterprise 
The company is the lowest level of command within the Army.  A generalized breakdown of the Army’s 
organizational structure is shown in Figure 1.  The company can conduct tactical operations 
independently, but relies upon its higher headquarters, the battalion, for administrative assistance and 
guidance.  They additionally have support services which are not at the company level such as Unit 
Ministry Teams (UMT), financial counselors, and medical assets.  The battalion is comprised of three to 
five companies and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel (O-5).  The battalion is part of a larger brigade 
which consists of three to five battalions and is commanded by a colonel (O-6).  This continues up the 
organizational chart. 
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Figure 1:  Army Organizational Structure
2
 
2.2 Leadership (ADP 6-22) 
The Army defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and 
motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”  Leaders may be assigned based 
on their position or can assume the role of a leader based on the situation.  A critical aspect of the 
definition of leadership is that is not only focuses on the near-term mission accomplishment, but the 
longer-term health and improvement of the organization.   These principles will carry over to high-risk 
soldier management in all stages.   
2.2.1 Applying Influence 
Leaders must influence those within and outside of the unit to achieve the greatest results.  On one end 
of influence is commitment, which is when individuals follow the leader voluntarily.  The other end is 
compliance, where leaders are required to follow an individual based on their position.  If an individual 
is committed to a mission as opposed to complying to orders, more motivation and initiative is 
                                                          
2
 Accessed 9 May 2013 from:  http://www.army.mil/info/organization/unitsandcommands/oud/ 
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expected.   Individuals should focus on providing leadership which fosters commitment as opposed to 
compliance alone.   
2.2.2 Situational Leadership 
Leaders must adapt based on the situation.  Components of a situation include individuals involved, the 
circumstances surrounding the individuals, the operational environment, historical background, and the 
specifics of what is to be accomplished.  It is vital for leaders to account for these to understand what 
methods of influence best suited for the situation.   
2.2.3 Informal Leadership 
Leaders do not need to be assigned as the leader or be the highest ranking individual.  In specific 
situations, individuals may have more knowledge or expertise and become informal leaders.   
2.2.4 Command and Leadership 
When in a command position, regulations (U.S. Army, 2008) have specific functions commanders must 
perform.  These tasks are to establish a positive command climate, caring for the well-being of soldiers, 
properly training their Soldiers and developing subordinates competence.  
2.2.5 Leadership Requirements Model 
The Army Leadership Requirements Model combines attributes a leader is expected to possess and the 
competencies a leader should be able to exhibit.  This is shown in Figure 2  Attributes are traits which 
are internal to the leader and competencies are a set of actions which the leader performs.   
 
Character – The internal set of beliefs of an individual.  Some of the key elements of a leaders character 
are integrity, empathy, adherence to Army Values (Appendix A), and discipline.  A leader of character 
does what is right, both legally and morally and sets a positive example for subordinates.   
 
Presence – The outward presentation of a leader.  This is defined the impression a leader makes on 
others.  Some of the elements which presence is comprised of are the leaders professional and military 
bearing, fitness levels, demonstration of confidence and resiliency level.  Subordinates will have more 
confidence in leaders who are professional, fit, and demonstrate confidence and will therefore be more 
likely to follow.  Additionally, a leaders’ level of resiliency helps to build resiliency within subordinates.   
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Intellect – This attribute focuses on the leader’s ability to process information, develop courses of 
action, and make decisions.  Leaders with intellect are able to rapidly adapt to changes in the situation 
and develop quality solution for their subordinates.  
2.2.6 Leader Competencies 
Leads – There are five areas which leaders focus on in this section.  The first is leads others which 
focuses on influencing individuals within the organization.  The next is to build trust which fosters a 
positive work environment and allows for effective influence.  Another critical element is the ability to 
extend influence outside of the chain of command.  This is critical when the leader does not have 
authority over individuals outside of the organization, but still relies upon those individuals to 
accomplish the mission.  The final elements are leading by example and the ability to communicate.   
 
Develops – The first element of this competency is to create a positive environment within the 
organization.  Positive command climate and unit cohesion are indicators of success in this area.  
Another aspect is the preparation of self.  This focuses on the self-development of the leader.  
Developing others is another critical competency of a leader.  This is accomplished through coaching, 
counseling and mentoring.  The final element is that leaders are stewards of the profession and take 
seriously the standards of the Army. 
 
Achieves – The sole element is to get results.  Leaders must motivate and set the conditions for success 
for their subordinates.  If they are successful, the leaders will achieve the desired results.   
17 
 
 
Figure 2:  Leadership Requirements Model
3
 
                                                          
3
 U.S. Army (2012). Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership, pg. iii 
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2.2.7 Leader Development  
These attributes and competencies can be developed.  These are developed through formal and 
informal leadership training and experiences.  There are multiple formal systems utilized for leader 
development such as evaluations, but each event is an opportunity for development.  Leaders must 
ensure they provide feedback to subordinates to develop leaders, but also accept feedback from 
subordinates, peers, and superiors in order to continue develop as a leader.   
2.3 Mission Command (ADP 6-0) 
The Army defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using 
mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and 
adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” (Error! Reference source not found. 6-0)  
Mission command allows commanders to provide their intent; purpose of the operation, key tasks and 
desired end state but gives subordinates the flexibility to execute based on their specific knowledge of 
the situation. An overview is provided in Figure 3.   When utilizing mission command, there are six basic 
principles used.  The first is to build cohesive teams through mutual trust.  This allows for commanders 
to trust that the intent of their order is being followed and for subordinates to trust their commander 
will allow them to execute the mission accordingly.  The next principle is creating a shared 
understanding.  This creates organizational alignment with respect to the situation.  If all individuals are 
on the same page and have a shared understanding, ambiguity is removed.  Once this is completed, a 
clear commander’s intent must be provided.  This intent provides the purpose of the operation and 
what the desired outcome is.  This allows subordinates to know what needs to be accomplished and the 
limits to their constraints.  Once the subordinate is provided with all this information, it is critical for the 
subordinate to exercise disciplined initiative.  Disciplined initiative is defined as “action in the absence of 
orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats 
arise.”  A commander cannot make every single decision.  Many decisions are delegated to subordinates 
and disciplined initiative ensures they make decisions which align with the intent of the operation.  This 
information is communicated in the use of mission orders.  Mission orders focus on the ends not the 
means.  The final principle is the acceptance of prudent risk.  Commanders cannot be risk adverse but 
must take acceptable risks in order to accomplish a mission.   
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Figure 3:  Mission Command
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Mission command attempts to balance what is known as the “art of command” with the “science of 
control”.  The art of command focuses on leadership and decision making.  Leadership demonstrates 
how commanders influence their units and decision making focuses on how commanders process 
information and make decisions.  The science of control focuses on the “systems and procedures used to 
improve the commander’s understanding and support accomplishing missions.”   Some of the aspects of 
the science of control are information, communication, organizational structure and degree of control.  
These are managed by the mission command system.  The elements which must be considered in this 
system are personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and 
equipment. 
 
Mission command can also be used in high-risk soldier management.  For example, a common command 
philosophy is to “take care of soldiers” with respect to high-risk soldier management.  This can mean 
different things to different individuals.  First, the commander must ensure cohesive teams are formed 
and there is trust throughout the unit, otherwise, mission command will be difficult to perform.  It is 
impossible for a company commander to have full situational understanding of the specifics of every 
soldier in his command’s personal life; therefore, the commander must rely on subordinate leaders.  In 
order to do this, while utilizing the mission command principles, the commander will provide mission 
orders, which do not tell leaders how to do their jobs, but what is expected.  Within these orders the 
commander must create a shared understanding of the problem.  The commander must explain the 
purpose, the environment, resources available as well as acceptable risks.  The commander must also 
provide clear intent on the desired endstate in order to ensure subordinate leaders know what direction 
to go.  With this information, subordinate leaders should have a clear understanding of the situation and 
expectations and therefore can exercise disciplined initiative in accomplishing the mission.  Additionally 
the commander must account for differences in leaders.  For example, a commander would give less 
specific directions to an experienced and talented leader as opposed to an inexperienced and less 
talented leader.  Additionally, the development of mission command systems to high-risk soldier 
management is important.  How the commander manages personnel, processes and procedures within 
the company, and the management of networks for example.  These aspects the art of command and 
the science of control dominate.   
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2.4 The Operations Process (ADP 5-0) 
The operations process is the framework the army utilizes in order to implement mission command. 
(ADP 5-0)  The operations process consists of four activities, planning, preparing, executing and 
assessing.  An overview is provided in Figure 4.  This is a continuous cycle and assessment should be 
conducted at each activity.  These activities include the Army Design Methodology, Military Decision-
making Process and Troop Leading Procedures.  This study will focus on the utilization of Troop Leading 
Procedures (Appendix B) because it is the method primarily utilized by small-unit leaders (company and 
below), who do not have a staff.  The next activity is preparing.  This focuses on ensuring that all soldiers 
are ready to execute any assigned mission or task.  This step also allows for decision makers to develop a 
greater understanding of the situation.  Once units are able to plan and prepare, the final step is 
execution.  This activity takes the plan and puts it into action, normally triggered by what is known as a 
“decision point”.  The final step is assessment, which is continually performed.  It ensures progress is 
being made, or allows for changes based on updated information.  Some tools utilized are running 
estimates and after action reviews.  The most common method of assessment at the Company level is 
the after action review which is essentially a gap analysis identifying positives and negatives during the 
process.   
 
Additionally, there are four principles within the operations process.  The first is that commanders drive 
the operations process through their understanding and visualization of the situation, their description 
of the requirements, leadership and ability to assess the situation.  The next principle is to build and 
maintain situational understanding in order to piece all variables together to be able to have a holistic 
view of the situation.  After this, the next principle is to apply critical and creative thinking.  Critical 
thinking provides an in-depth understanding of the situation and critical thinking allows for new 
approaches to handle the situation.  The final principle is to encourage and enable dialogue which allows 
for more information to be spread and allows for a more complete understanding of the situation.   
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Figure 4:  The Operations Process
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These activities and principles can easily be applied to the four stages of high-risk soldier management.   
Each stage requires planning, preparation and execution with continuous assessment.  Ideally, leaders 
plan and prepare for each potential stage, only waiting for decision points to execute their plan in each 
phase.  For example, a soldier who is low-risk is arrested for DUI.  This unexpected arrest forces the unit 
leadership to execute within the response and mitigation stages.  Without an already plan ready for 
execution, the leader must quickly assess the situation, and develop a hasty plan, which may or may not 
have a full understanding of the entire situation and therefore not allow for the best possible approach 
to the situation.   
2.5 Training Units and Developing Leaders (ADP 7-0) 
Training units and developing leaders are related.  Good training helps develop leaders and good leaders 
develop good training.  Training and leader development creates leaders who are competent and able to 
adapt to difficult and rapidly changing situations.  Commanders are ultimately responsible for ensuring 
their units are fully trained and therefore must develop training to ensure this responsibility is met.  This 
is performed utilizing the principles discussed earlier (Leadership, Mission Command, and Operations 
Processes).   Commanders must determine what tasks are necessary to meet objectives set forth from 
higher headquarters and communicate this down to subordinates.  Battalion and Company 
Commanders develop the units mission-essential task list (METL) to support their higher headquarters 
mission.  They are unable to train all tasks, and therefore must select tasks which are most important to 
successful mission accomplishment.  The mastery of these tasks drives the training plan.  Commanders 
then assess the successfulness of their training and adapt training based on their assessments.   
2.5.1 Training 
There are three training domains within the Army.  The first is the institutional domain which conducted 
at Army schools.  The next is the operational training domain which is training conducted by units at 
home station or combat training centers.  The final domain is the self-development domain which allows 
individuals to learn on their own based on their professional and personal goals.  Training is also 
separated into individual and collective training.  Individual training feeds into collective training 
because collective training is essentially the sum of the individual’s skills and abilities.   The Army 
provides a series of principles leaders should follow when developing training.  These are shown below 
in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5:  Army Principles of Unit Training
6
 
2.5.2 Leader Development 
Leader development is a self-reinforcing cycle which must be performed at the unit level.  Good leaders 
develop other good leaders and the cycle continues.  Quality leaders are required in order to ensure unit 
readiness and successful mission accomplishment, both deployed and in garrison.  Leaders must remain 
proficient in basic skills, master skills required by their position, and develop the skills required for high 
positions of responsibility.  At the same time, they must ensure the same is being done by their 
subordinates.   Soldiers spend a majority of their time in units, and therefore it is important to build 
upon the knowledge learned in the institutional domain and reinforce and add to this knowledge at the 
unit level.  Therefore leader development at the unit level must be conducted.  In order to be truly 
successful, self-development will be used to fill any areas not covered by institutional or operational 
training.  The Army’s principles of leader development are shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6:  Army Principles of Leader Development
7
 
2.6 Composite Risk Management (FM 5-19) 
The Army utilizes a five step process known as composite risk management to identify hazards and 
control risks in all areas.  The five steps are:   Identify Hazards, Assess Hazards, Develop Controls and 
Make Decisions, Implement Controls, and Supervise and Evaluate.  It can be used for tactical and non-
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tactical scenarios.  This is a continuous cycle of assessment and decision making which allows for leaders 
to make risk decisions.  The process allows for hazards to be weighed and scored which allows for the 
appropriate level of decision making.  For example a junior leader will not be the final decision authority 
on an extremely high-risk raid on an enemy stronghold.  The extremely high-risk assessment will push 
the decision authority to someone higher in the chain of command.  Ultimately it allows for decision 
makers to avoid unnecessary risk while maintain the ability to avoid being risk averse.  The five step 
model depicted in Figure 7 will be described in more detail in the following paragraphs.   
  
Figure 7:  Army Composite Risk Management Cycle
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2.6.1 Step 1:  Identify Hazards 
The Army defines hazards as conditions, situations or events “with the potential to cause injury; illness, 
or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation” in any 
environment.  Some of the non-tactical hazards discussed are sexual assault, domestic violence, 
substance abuse, STDs and other behavioral or medical conditions.   
 
The Army utilizes two options for a standardized methodology in identifying hazards.  The first, which is 
widely known is METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops, Time, and Civilian 
Considerations), an alternate, but more applicable methodology for non-mission activities is Activity, 
Disrupter, Terrain and weather, People, Time, and Legal.  Activity focuses on specific activities which are 
planned which may require a risk assessment to be completed (i.e. Long Holiday Weekend).  Disrupter is 
any type of outside influence which may have an impact on the activity.  Terrain and weather focuses on 
activities which the weather may effect (i.e. Blizzard during block leave travel dates).  People are any 
individuals associated with the unit.  Time is described as the tendency for individuals to rush through 
                                                          
8
 U.S. Army (2006). Field Manual 5-19, Composite Risk Management. pg. 1-2. 
26 
 
things (i.e. Haphazard vehicle inspections prior to a long weekend).  Finally, Legal focuses on any type of 
regulations or policies which may affect an activity.   
2.6.2 Step 2:  Assess Hazards 
In this stage, leaders make a determination of risk based on the probability of an event and the severity 
of an outcome of an event.  Once these two elements are combined a risk assessment is determined.  
The probability of an event occurring is a five point scale consisting of frequent, likely, occasional, 
seldom, and unlikely.   The severity scale is ranked on a four point scale from catastrophic, critical, 
marginal, and negligible.  From the combination of these two scales, the risk assessment level is 
determined based on the Risk Assessment Matrix shown in Figure 8.  There are four levels of risk 
defined: 
 Extremely High Risk – Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if hazards occur during mission. 
 High Risk – Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the required mission 
standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission or inability to complete the mission to 
standard if hazards occur during the mission.   
 Moderate Risk – Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of the required mission 
standards and will result in reduced mission capability if hazards occur during mission.   
 Low Risk – Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission.   
 
Figure 8:  Risk Assessment Matrix
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2.6.3 Step 3:  Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions  
Once hazards are identified and assessed, the next step is to develop controls and make decisions on 
what controls will be implemented and decisions based on the remaining risk after the controls are 
implemented.  There are three types of controls identified.  The first is educational controls which focus 
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on developing the awareness of individuals through training.  The next control is physical controls which 
provide physical separation from hazards.  The final type of control discussed were avoidance and 
elimination controls that prevent contact or eliminate a hazard.  The effectiveness of these controls is 
judged on three criteria of suitability, feasible, and acceptability.  An example which demonstrates the 
controls and criteria is in Table 1.   
Table 1:  DUI Prevention Control Example 
Control Goal: Prevent DUI    
Control Description Type of Control Suitable Feasible Acceptable 
Training on responsible use of alcohol training Educational Yes Yes Yes 
Installation of breathalyzer on soldiers’ car Physical Control Yes No No 
Ban off duty alcohol use during weekends Elimination No No No 
 
Once effective controls are established, leaders must reassess risk to see if it is now at an acceptable 
level.  If the risk level is at an acceptable level, the leader makes a decision to continue.  If not, the 
leader must decide develop additional controls or reassess the situation. 
2.6.4 Step 4:  Implement Controls 
Once controls are decided upon, it is critical for the leader to implement the controls.  In order to 
implement these controls, the leaders must ensure clear and simple execution orders are provided and 
ensure communication channels remain open.   
2.6.5 Step 5:  Supervise and Evaluate 
Since composite risk management is a continuous process it is critical for leaders to continually assess 
the situation.  First, leaders must supervise to allow leaders to understand if the controls are 
implemented correctly.  Once controls are implemented, leaders must identify any new hazards, assess 
the effectiveness of the current controls, ensure implementation, execution and communication of 
controls is done to standards, assess residual risk, and make necessary changes to ensure risk is 
mitigated. 
2.7 Army Health Promotion 
This program focuses on tying health and well-being of soldiers into daily operations.  The Army health 
promotion program addresses the five following areas:  Health education and promotion, behavioral 
health interventions, physical programs, spiritual programs, and environmental and social programs.  
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Army health promotion applies the principles from the composite risk management process to support 
the well-being of Army units.  The goal of the Army Health Promotion Program is detailed below: 
 
“…maximize readiness, warfighting ability, and work performance.  Objectives include 
enhancing the well-being of all Soldiers, Army civilians, Family members, and retirees; 
and encouraging lifestyles that improve and protect physical, behavioral, and spiritual 
health.” (U.S. Army, 2007, pg. 2) 
2.7.1 Behavioral Health 
The Army’s behavioral health program attempts to promote behavioral health through three critical 
areas.  These areas are strengthening individuals, strengthening communities and reducing structural 
barriers to health.  In order to strengthen individuals, the program emphasizes providing quality 
programs in multiple areas such as stress relief, newcomer briefings, and relationship building programs.  
To strengthen communities, the program focuses on improving connections between people and 
organizations and between organizations.  These programs include health fairs and partnerships 
between behavioral health services and units.  The final element of reduction of structural barriers 
makes it easy and stress free to utilize behavioral health services.   
 
Some of the specific programs provided by behavioral health include stress management, combat 
operational stress control, suicide prevention and surveillance, responsible sexual behavior, and the 
Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP).  Stress management assists soldiers and family members to 
manage and mitigate stress in any form (personal or professional).  Combat operation stress control 
centers on the prevention of combat related stress for soldiers.  Stress in combat is expected, and 
therefore, this program attempts to mitigate the effects of stress before it occurs.  The suicide 
prevention program attempts to minimize suicide throughout the Army and minimize the effect of 
suicidal behavior on others.  The responsible sexual behavior program encourages responsible sexual 
behavior to maintain operational readiness.  Finally, the ASAP defines the Army’s policies for the 
prevention and mitigation of substance abuse within the ranks.   
2.7.2 Physical Health  
The physical health and well-being is critical for the success of units.  It ties directly into the soldier’s 
ability to perform combat related tasks which has a significant impact on the unit’s ability to conduct 
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operations.  Physical health consists of multiple elements.  These include the fitness and health 
program, injury prevention, ergonomics, oral health, nutrition, and weight management.  
2.7.3 Spiritual Fitness 
Spiritual fitness is a holistic form of development.  It attempts to take into account the different 
dimensions of a human being and find balance.  Being spiritually fit assists individuals during times of 
hardship.   
2.7.4 Environmental Health 
The environmental health program was designed to ensure individuals were safe from any type of 
environmental threats.  These threats include air and water quality and workplace safety.  Additionally, 
it focuses on public health campaigns to encourage healthy lifestyle.  
2.7.5 Command Responsibilities 
There are a series of specific requirements that commanders must do order to comply with the 
program.  Commanders must publish a health promotion policy to promote well-being within their 
respective units.  Many of the requirements focus on unit culture and the establishment of a command 
climate which supports the health promotion program such as remaining sensitive and responsive to the 
needs of unit members and their families and to treat all soldiers with dignity and respect when 
assistance is required to assist in challenges.  The complete list is provided in Appendix C.   
2.8 Specific Programs at the Company Level 
This framework provides a general outline of how high-risk soldiers are managed at the company level.    
The Army provides six categories for leaders to identify a soldier’s ability to function.  These areas are 
physical, emotional/behavioral, occupational, social/interpersonal, financial and legal/disciplinary.  The 
chain of command takes each of these categories into account when determining a soldier’s level of risk 
(low, moderate, high).  No two soldiers are the same and therefore, the unit must identify each 
individual soldier utilizing these categories.  Based on the classification, the chain of command decides 
how each individual soldier is managed. Within each company there are a series of Army-wide programs 
and systems which focus on certain aspects of the Soldiers ability to function.  The programs listed 
below are many of the critical programs, but not the only programs.  There may be additional programs 
at the local level based on specific situations.  Figure 9 provides a graphical overview of the company 
programs which will be discussed and their relation to the six soldier functional elements that comprise 
the whole soldier concept and are used to identify high-risk soldiers.   
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Figure 9:  Company Program Overview 
2.8.1 Leader Development Program 
The principles of leader development described in FM 7-0 are to be implemented at the company level.  
Companies must develop a leader development program specifically tailored to the needs of the 
company.  The leader development program ensures individuals are proficient in their mission essential 
tasks, then focuses on developing for the further levels of responsibility.  Some of the programs utilized 
at the company level are Officer Professional Development (OPD) sessions, which is primarily the 
commander working with the lieutenants in the battery,   Noncommissioned Officer Development 
Program (NCODP), which is driven by the unit 1SG for NCOs, and Sergeant’s Time Training which 
dedicates time to NCOs to conduct small unit and individual training and builds team cohesion.  Another 
critical aspect of the unit’s leader development program is units counseling program.  (Occupational, 
Emotional/Behavioral, Social/Interpersonal) 
2.8.2 Army Warrior Training 
Army Warrior Training ensures all soldiers remain proficient in basic soldier skills.  This training provides 
the foundation for more advanced individual and collective training which much be accomplished to 
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support the units mission.  These fundamental tasks should be integrated into other training to 
maximize training time.  (Occupational) 
2.8.3 Mission Essential Training 
The primary role of the company is to ensure the unit readiness.  Following the guidance set forth in 
ADP 7-0, commanders develop training programs to ensure the unit is competent in all elements of its 
mission essential task list.  In garrison, mission essential training is the primary driver of what the 
company does on a day to day basis.  The remainder of the other programs must fit be managed within 
the constructs of ensuring the unit is trained and competent in its mission essential task list.  This also 
plays an important role in high-risk soldier management.  Training allows soldiers to be more proficient 
in their ability, and it often forces individuals to work together which may increase unit cohesion if done 
correctly.  (Occupational, Emotional/Behavioral, Social/Interpersonal)  
2.8.4 Resilience Training 
This training focuses on preparing soldiers for the hardships they may face, not only in combat, but in 
everyday life.  Soldiers continually face personal and professional stressors and this training assists 
soldiers identify challenges and develop skills to cope with these challenges.  It also assists leaders in 
developing a skillset to help foster resilience within their units.  Training at the unit level is conducted in 
the pre-deployment and post-deployment phases of the ARFORGEN cycle.  (Emotional/Behavioral, 
Social/Interpersonal Occupational) 
2.8.5 Army Substance Abuse Program (AR 600-85): 
The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) defines the Army’s policies for the prevention and 
mitigation of substance abuse within the ranks.  At the company level, the goal of this program is to 
ensure unit readiness by ensuring the fitness of the members of the unit.  The program focuses on two 
main tenants, prevention and treatment.  Prevention focuses on education, deterrence, referrals, 
intervention, risk reduction and detection.  Treatment focuses on intervention, screening and 
rehabilitation.  The company has multiple responsibilities within this Army wide program.  Some of 
these include the execution of the drug and alcohol testing program, annual training, and fostering a 
command climate which supports soldiers in need of assistance and discourages drug and alcohol abuse.  
(Physical, Emotional/Behavioral, Occupational, Social, Legal/Disciplinary)    
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2.8.6 Suicide Prevention (DA Pam 600-24): 
Each unit has a suicide prevention program which focuses on preventing suicides by ensuring the well-
being of each soldier.   Some of the critical elements of the suicide prevention program include but are 
not limited to the following requirements.  Commanders will ensure their units conduct annual suicide 
prevention training and ensure there are awareness by leaders at all levels.  Another critical 
requirement is that there is a command climate which encourages Soldiers to seek help and all soldiers 
and leaders are aware of available tools and resources.   
 
This program is primarily focused in all four elements of the emotional/behavioral functional area.  In 
order to prevent suicide, members of the unit must understand the factors which lead to suicide.  Units 
must focus building resiliency in its members.  Another critical aspect is the reduction of stigma 
associated with suicide to be companied with an awareness and communication plan.  If factors are 
identified, the ability to intervene and the steps to take in order to intervene are critical.  Finally, if a 
suicide or suicide attempt does occur, the company must have a plan to support survivors or those 
affected by the suicide.   (Emotional/Behavioral, Occupational) 
2.8.7 Family Readiness Group (AR 600-20 pg 56) 
In order to support the Total Army Facility Program, company commanders must foster an environment 
which encourages the support of families.  The primary method outreach to the families is the Family 
Readiness Group (FRG).  The FRG has multiple critical roles at the company level.  It is the official 
mechanism for the command to disseminate information to families.  It provides families with the most 
up to date and valid information, it assists in referring families to resources which may be unknown, and 
prepares families for deployment and redeployment stressors.  Finally, it helps build cohesion between 
the unit and the families, where natural tensions may occur due to conflicts of interest.  
(Emotional/Behavioral, Social/Interpersonal) 
2.8.8 Family Care Plans (AR 600-20 pg. 48) 
In addition to the family readiness group, companies must ensure all required personnel have adequate 
family care plans.  A family care plan ensures a soldier’s family is taken care of while deployed. This is 
critical for mission readiness.  Family care plans are mandatory single parents or dual military with 
family members.  This ensures there is a plan in place for the care of dependent family members while 
the soldier or soldiers are deployed.  While it is not mandatory for all soldiers, leaders should ensure 
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that all soldiers have a plan to ensure their affairs are taken care of while deployed.  
(Social/Interpersonal, Occupational) 
2.8.9 Army Physical Fitness Program: 
Each company designs their specific physical fitness program in accordance with guidance set forth in AR 
350-1.  The physical fitness program is designed to improve combat readiness by developing and 
maintaining physically fit soldiers and is specifically designed at the company level, while meeting 
requirements from higher headquarters.  Soldiers’ level of fitness is tested by the Army Physical Fitness 
Test (APFT).   Some of objectives of the physical fitness program are to enhance muscular strength and 
endurance, aerobic and anaerobic fitness, body composition, promote a healthy lifestyle, and to 
enhance resiliency and self-discipline.  (Physical, Emotional/Behavioral, Occupational) 
2.8.10 Army Weight Control Program 
The Army Weight Control Program is managed at the company level.  This program ensures all members 
of the company maintain weight and body composition within Army standards as well as maintain a 
Soldierly appearance.  Soldiers are weighted and must either be under a specified weight (based on age 
and height) or meet body fat requirements if over the specified weight.  If a soldier is above 
recommended weight and body fat percentage they are to be placed in the weight control program.  
The soldier will then receive a medical evaluation and nutritional counseling.  If the soldier is unable to 
meet the standards, the soldier may be separated from service.  (Physical, Emotional/Behavioral, 
Occupational) 
2.8.11 Command Climate Training 
Command Climate Training is series of training events which focus on establishing a positive command 
climate.  This training includes fraternization training, sexual harassment training, sexual assault and 
prevention training, equal opportunity training, and Army Substance Abuse Program education.  
(Emotional/Behavioral, Occupational, Social, Disciplinary/Legal) 
2.8.12 Traffic Safety Program 
This program has been established to ensure soldiers drive safely and responsibly.  Commanders must 
have a system in place to ensure that all individuals who operate vehicles are properly licensed before 
operating the vehicles.  Additionally, the unit is responsible for ensuring privately owned vehicles are 
inspected by leaders.  This is to be performed at least semi-annually, but is often conducted monthly.  
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Finally, companies must ensure all motorcycle riders are licensed and complete a motorcycle riders 
course.  (Emotional/Behavioral, Physical) 
2.8.13 Retention Program 
This program is focused on the retention of quality personnel within the unit.  The company ensures 
that all individuals who are eligible for reenlistment are informed of incentives or additional information 
pertinent to their situation.   Additionally, the unit will hold ceremonies are held in which coworkers and 
family members may attend.  The company commander may also deny reenlistment to individuals who 
are not suited for future service.  This is called a bar to reenlistment.  This rehabilitative tool requires 
justification for the bar to be placed on the individual, and if the soldier overcomes the rationale for the 
bar, it may be lifted and the individual may continue service.  (Occupational, Financial) 
2.9 Support Services and Additional Resources 
In addition to the programs provided at the company level, there are also a series of external resources 
provided to the members at the company level.  These resources provide multiple forms of assistance in 
areas in which most individuals at the company level are untrained in.  A list of these services is provided 
in Appendix D.   
2.9.1 Soldier Leader Risk Reduction Tool (SLRRT) 
The Soldier Leader Risk Reduction Tool was developed to assist leaders in identifying issues for soldiers.  
An example of the SLRRT is shown in Appendix E.   There are multiple questions focused on the six areas 
of concerned above.  More details can be found at the Guide for Soldier Leader Risk Reduction Tool.  
Depending upon the soldier’s response, there is a corresponding leader action.  For example if a soldier 
has had difficulty coping with a loss, it instructs the leader to refer the soldier to one of a series of 
support services.  It is important to note that the Army has marketed this to the force as a “tool” and not 
a requirement or tracker.  An example of this is the video provided at this link:  
http://youtu.be/fC6FEuZ8NXc 
2.9.2 High-Risk Matrix 
The high risk matrix is a tool used to track and manage soldiers who are identified as high-risk.  It lists 
the individual’s names, why they are issued, mitigation measures, and the supervisors plan.  Its uses are 
two-fold; it allows leaders to track soldier issues within the battery, which can be difficult at the 
company and battalion levels.  Additionally it is a forcing function to drive leaders to develop plans of 
action for their subordinates.   An example is shown below in Figure 10. 
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2.9.3 Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback 360 Program 
This is a tool utilized to provide feedback to leaders on their performance from superiors, peers and 
subordinates. (MSAF Website)  Its primary purpose is to provide an accurate assessment to leaders from 
those in which they interact with.  This this tool is not used for evaluation purposes.    
 
 
Figure 10:  Example High-Risk Matrix 
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Chapter 3 
3.1 The Enterprise 
This analysis focuses on the company as an enterprise.  An enterprise is defined as “a complex, 
integrated, and interdependent system of people, processes, and technology that creates value as 
determined by its key stakeholders.”  (Nightingale and Srinivasan, 2011).  In order to fully understand 
the system, we must first understand who is involved in the system, or stakeholders, and the benefits or 
utility in which the stakeholders receive or provide to the enterprise or other stakeholders.  These 
benefits or utility is known as value.  It is also important to understand the larger context the enterprise 
operates in, or ecosystem.   
3.2 The Company as the Enterprise 
The primary reason the company was chosen for the enterprise because it is still considered a 
“command”, but is still small enough where the command team can maintain personal relationship will 
all members of the unit.  As mentioned earlier, the average company is normally from 60-200 people.  
The next highest level of command, the battalion, consists of 500-600 soldiers and therefore it is difficult 
for the commander to have a personal relationship with every member of the unit.  Therefore it is the 
highest level of leadership where the leader can retain awareness on all individuals within the 
organization.   
 
The company also fits the description of an enterprise.  There are several stakeholders which expect to 
receive value from the processes which take place at the company level.  These stakeholders will be 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  Many of the programs which are managed at the company 
level were discussed in chapter two.  Ultimately, the unit leadership must develop a system to ensure 
that the objectives of the company are met through planning, execution within multiple levels within 
the company and coordination with outside groups.   
 
The internal organization of the company consists of four layers.  The command team (commander and 
first sergeant), the platoon leadership (platoon leader and platoon sergeant), squad leaders, and soldiers 
within the squads.  This hierarchical structure is important in considering the enterprise of analysis.  A 
majority of the direct leadership occurs at the squad level based on the structure of the company (9-12 
squads per company with 4-10 soldiers per squad).  Therefore the policies and priorities made at the 
company level have a direct influence on the day to day operations at the squad level and below.   
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3.2.1 Internal Stakeholders 
There are three major stakeholder groups within the company which will be analyzed.  The first 
stakeholder group that will be considered is the Command Team.  The command team consists of the 
company commander and first sergeant.  As discussed earlier, the commander is the senior 
commissioned officer responsible for everything within the company and the first sergeant is the senior 
enlisted soldier within the company.  The first sergeant assists the commander in the implementation 
and execution of policy at the company level.  As the senior leaders in the company, they play a critical 
role in the unit command climate and defining the organizations culture.  The command team is also the 
link between the company and the higher headquarters. 
 
The next stakeholder group is Direct Leaders; this includes the commander, first sergeant, platoon 
leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders.  This stakeholder group focuses on the front line, one on 
one leadership within the company.  The commander and first sergeant are the direct leaders of the 
platoon leadership.  The platoon leadership is directly responsible for the squad leadership and the 
squad leadership is directly responsible members of their squads.  Ideally, this vertical structure allows 
for organizational alignment within the company, as the command priorities become the platoon 
priorities, which become the squad and soldier priorities.   
 
The final stakeholder group within the company is all soldiers, but this group will be divided into three 
subgroups, Low-Risk Soldiers, Potential High-Risk Soldiers and High-Risk Soldiers.  The qualifications for 
each category are described below: 
 
 Low-Risk:  No risk factors or high risk events identified 
 Potential High-Risk:  Risk factors identified 
 High-Risk:  Participation in High-Risk event identified 
 
All soldiers within the unit fall within one of these three groups, including members of the command 
team and direct leaders.  It is important to note that although the most at-risk population is the 
youngest soldiers in the company, not all high-risk soldiers are junior soldiers.  It is possible for anyone 
within the Army to be considered high risk, depending upon their situation.   
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3.2.2 External Stakeholders 
There are four external stakeholder groups to the company who have direct interactions with the 
company and members within the company.  These groups have regular interaction and have an impact 
on the high-risk soldier management.  The first group is the Battalion Leadership.  The battalion is the 
higher headquarters for the company and its members provide leadership and guidance to the 
company.  The company commander and first sergeant are the primary interfaces for contact between 
the company and the battalion.   
 
Another critical stakeholder group is the Support Services provided to soldiers.  There are a multitude of 
services provided at the battalion, brigade and post level.  These services include, but are not limited to 
counseling services, medical providers, unit ministry teams, and financial counseling services.  A more 
complete list is provided in Appendix D.  Soldiers are often referred to these services if they require 
assistance, therefore it is critical for individuals to know what services are available and where they can 
be found.  It is also important to note that there are differences between medical and non-medical 
support services.  Many of the medical support services fall under HIPPA guidelines.  Due to this, many 
leaders face challenges in determining the medical status of soldiers who see providers without the 
consent of the soldier.   
 
The third external stakeholder group is dependents.  Dependents will be defined as anyone who relies 
upon a soldier for support.  The most common dependents are spouses and children, but may also 
include other family members and possibly friends.  Dependents are important because they can be a 
source of support or stress for a soldier. (Dolan and Ender, 2008)  Additionally, they can be critical 
sensors of high-risk behaviors when soldiers are off duty.   
 
The final stakeholder group is the soldiers’ Social Network.  These are basically the friends and family of 
a soldier who do not rely upon the soldier for support.  There may be some overlap with the company as 
soldiers are often friends with other soldiers within a unit, but this accounts for the social interactions 
outside of work.  These groups are important because many of the high-risk behaviors which are found 
take place outside of work.  The individuals a soldier surrounds himself with outside of work has a direct 
impact on what he does.  Therefore it is important to take into account a soldier’s social network as a 
stakeholder group.    
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In addition to understanding why the company was selected as the enterprise of analysis and the key 
stakeholder groups, both internal and external, it is also critical to understand the environment in which 
the company operates in.  This environment is the ecosystem in which the company operates.   
3.2.3 Ecosystem 
At the highest level of the ecosystem in which the company operates in is the national political system.  
Therefore it is important to understand the implications of national policy at the company level.  First 
and foremost, the nation has been at war for over a decade.  The war in Afghanistan began in 2001 and 
is projected to be over in 2014 and the war in Iraq lasted from 2003 to 2011.  These two wars have 
resulted high operational tempo (OPTEMO) for soldiers, creating a requirement for soldiers to deploy 
from 9 – 15 months a time with as little as a year between deployments.  The Army has struggled to 
provide soldiers the optimal 2 years at home to 1 year deployed ratio due to the vast operational 
requirements. 
 
Due to this there has been an incredible amount of stress placed on soldiers and their families.  In 
addition, there has been a generation of soldiers whose entire careers have been rotating between 
deployments and are unfamiliar with long term garrison operations.  With the completion of the war in 
Afghanistan approaching, the Army is likely to transition to more of a garrison force, with a significant 
decrease in the OPTEMPO for soldiers.  Although the stressors of combat will decline with fewer 
deployments, there is a potential for additional high-risk behaviors due to a combination of factors such 
as more free time and the possibility of substituting the adrenaline rush of combat with high-risk 
behaviors at home.  Additionally, there is an increase in pay due to deployments.  Soldiers do not pay 
income taxes while deployed and there are additional bonuses such as hazardous duty pay and family 
separation pay.  This can lead to financial hardships upon return once the soldier pay is returned to 
normal levels.   
 
In addition to the decreased pace of deployments due to the decisions to end the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the uncertainty due to the political battles over the budget and national debt may lead to 
less defense spending.  This may lead to a decrease in resources available for training or support services 
on bases which may require soldiers take on new responsibilities which were previously contracted out 
to civilians.  Additionally, soldiers may lose some of the support services previously provided. For 
example, if building maintenance crews are cut, soldiers may need to pick up additional duties such as 
building clean up.  Another possibility is if the number of financial advisors on a post is cut, it is harder 
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for soldiers schedule meetings.   With end strength cuts budget cutbacks reduce the size of the force is 
at a time when the national economy is still suffering from high rates of employment may be unsettling.  
All of these impacts from national policy can lead to new stressors for soldiers and leaders.   
 
From these national policy decisions, the flow of resources and policy works its way down through the 
Army to Corps to Divisions to Brigades.  In the modular system, the Brigade Combat Team is the lowest 
level which can independently deploy.  The brigade is allocates resources and disseminates its priorities 
to the battalions and companies.  The brigade commander communicates his priorities through the 
battalion and it is expected for the company to develop operations to ensure alignment.  The brigade 
commander rates the company commander and reviews the first sergeant’s evaluations and therefore 
has a significant amount of influence in the decisions made at the company level. 
 
The decisions made at the national level may influence decisions made brigade level.  First, a successful 
brigade command is an important factor for promotion to brigadier general.   With the elimination of 
combat tours, brigade commanders may find it necessary to make up for the lack of a “combat 
command” on their resume with high profile training events.  If these high profile events are coupled 
with a lack of resources at the company level due to budget cutbacks and unpredictable schedules due 
to additional takings due to decreased services, individuals at the company level are likely to become 
frustrated.   
 
An additional element of the ecosystem which has an impact on high-risk soldier programs is the post 
that the company is on.  Every army post is unique.  Many posts have similar services, but the details of 
each may differ.  In addition to differences in infrastructure on posts, the geographic locations of the 
posts also may have an impact.  Differences in activities provided in surrounding areas, local economy, 
etc. all may have an impact on soldier behavior.   
 
A final element of the ecosystem which must be addressed is the explosion of social media over the past 
decade.  For example Facebook began in 2004 and currently has over 1 billion active users. (Facebook)  
This has created a new dynamic which leaders did not face in the garrison army prior to the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  This has been an increase in the expectation of instant information which may lead to 
difficulties in communication or a sense that leadership is not being forthright if it does not provide 
information immediately to soldiers and families.   
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3.3 Temporal stages of Soldier Welfare 
In order to understand the high-risk soldiers, a common understanding of the movement from low to 
high-risk and back must be developed.  The model inFigure 11 Figure 11 demonstrates the relationship 
between low-risk, potential high-risk and high-risk Soldiers in the identification of high-risk Soldiers 
based on the definitions provided earlier.  A soldier with no identified risk factors is considered a low-
risk soldier.  Upon identification of risk factors, the Soldier will moves into the potential high-risk 
category.  Once an individual is involved in a high-risk event, they are classified as a high-risk soldier.  
Once a high-risk event occurs, there are a series of actions taken dependent upon the specifics of the 
situation.  Ideally, these events return the Soldier to the potential high-risk category.  If a soldier is 
considered a potential high risk, there are steps the individual can take which can mitigate the identified 
risk factors and return the Soldier to the low-risk category.  Ideally, a soldier will not move directly from 
the low-risk to the high-risk category.  This is most likely a failure in risk factor identification.  It is also 
unlikely for a soldier to move from the high-risk category, directly to the low-risk category.  There are 
likely remnants remaining from the high-risk event which can be identified as risk factors which allowed 
the Soldier to be identified as a potential high-risk. 
 
 
Figure 11:  Soldier Movement Between Categories 
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Utilizing the model above as a guide, four stages can be identified.  These stages are not necessarily 
independent, but it allows for a better conceptualization of the problem at different areas.  The four 
stages are discussed below:   
 
1) Prevention:  This stage focuses on ensuring Soldiers stay in the low risk category and do not 
move into the high risk category. 
2) Identification:  This stage focuses on identifying factors which may lead to high risk behavior or 
identification of high-risk behaviors which are being performed.   
3) Mitigation:  This stage focuses on the elimination of factors which place a soldier in the potential 
high-risk category.   
4) Response:  This stage focuses on the response to high-risk soldiers and their behaviors. 
 
As mentioned above, these stages are not mutually exclusive.  For example, a leader focuses his time on 
preventing movement from low to high-risk.  He must also be actively scanning for identifiers which may 
lead to high risk behavior.  Another example is if a soldier is facing UCMJ actions for a high risk behavior.  
Due to the pending UCMJ actions (Response) the soldier is exhibiting symptoms of depression 
(Identification) in which the soldier must receive assistance (Mitigation).  These examples demonstrate 
some of the difficulties in managing a high-risk soldier program.   
3.4 Questions 
In order to fully understand the company a holistic approach must be taken.  There are three major 
components which interact with one another, the unit, the individual and external stakeholders.  All 
three are reliant on one another and the interactions are critical to understand. In order to better 
understand the entire system it is graphically depicted in Figure 12.   The questions are developed in 
order to better understand the relationships between stakeholders, processes at the company level, and 
relationships between.  In another words, this is an attempt to understand the enterprise with respect 
to soldier welfare.     
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Figure 12:  Architecture of System 
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Question 1:  What is a high-risk soldier?   
 
This question is to be asked in order to see if there is a common mental model within the organization.  
Mental models are defined as “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or 
images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action.” (Senge , 1990, pg. 8) In 
order to understand the problem, the first critical aspect is to understand if all leaders possess a shared 
mental model.   This question will identify if there are any gaps between Army definition and mental 
models of leaders at different levels within the company.  If there are large differences in mental 
models, it may explain some of the difficulties in ensuring the welfare and discipline of soldiers at the 
company level.  If triggers for prevention and intervention are not standardized, then some individuals 
may slip through the cracks.  The definition of a high-risk soldier is critical because it drives leader 
behaviors at each stage of the process (prevention, identification, mitigation, and response).  Therefore 
any differences in definitions may lead cause misalignment throughout the leaders of the enterprise. 
 
Question 2:  Who is responsible for high-risk soldiers at the company level? 
 
These questions are asked in conjunction with the first question and hope to further identify the mental 
models of leaders at the company level.  These mental models allow the members of the organization to 
coordinate their behaviors based on the shared environment and knowledge of the situation.  
(Mohammed, Ferzandi, Hamilton 2010;  Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1993)   The military has clearly stated 
that the health, welfare, and discipline of soldiers are a command responsibility (Department of 
Defense, 2002).  Culturally, the term “take care of soldiers” is used within the Army to describe what a 
leader’s responsibility is.  The Army identifies multiple elements in order to “take care of soldiers”.  
Some of the elements include adequately preparing soldiers to perform their jobs as soldiers through 
challenging, but safe training, promoting an environment of growth and learning, while ensuring 
discipline within the force, and to build a personal relationship with soldiers in order to improve 
performance and provide professional and personal assistance when needed. (U.S. Army 2012, Army 
Doctrine Publication 6-22 (ADP 6-22))    
 
While the command is tasked with ensuring soldier health, welfare and discipline, a commander cannot 
do everything; therefore, many of the responsibilities are delegated to lower level leaders, such as 
platoon and squad leaders.  This question hopes to better conceptualize the mental models of leaders to 
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identify the roles of different leaders within the organization, ideally identifying the most critical leaders 
within the company.  
 
Question 3:  Should leaders be responsible for high-risk soldiers and how important is it?  Why or why 
not? 
 
This question hopes to determine the motivation of leaders in ensuring soldier welfare.  We will analyze 
what is known as military ethic.  Military ethic is defined as “a set of shared explicit and implicit moral 
values and principles intended to guide the conduct of military professionals in the performance of their 
duties.”  (Jennings & Hannah, 2011)  The concept that a leader is not only responsible for a subordinate 
both on and off duty is somewhat unique to the military and therefore, may seem unnecessary to some 
leaders who are only focused on if a soldier “does his job” or not.  This question hopes to determine if 
leaders care for soldiers because they are required to or because they are intrinsically motivated.  In 
short, are leaders taking care of soldiers because they have to or want to? 
 
Morality is a critical concept to understand in this situation.  Two possibilities for types of moralities are 
the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty, or obligation.  (Fuller, 1969; Jennings & Hannah, 
2011)  The morality of obligation is centered on rule following and the avoidance of denunciation by 
others.  (Jones & Ryan, 1997).  The other type of morality, the morality of aspiration, drives leaders to 
strive to act in a manner which is praiseworthy and aligned with military values.  In the case of morality 
of obligation, leaders will be driven by rules or controls, in the case of morality of aspiration, leaders will 
be driven by things such as living within Army values.    The morality of obligation provides a minimum 
floor for behavior while the morality of aspiration provides a ceiling.  (Jennings and Hannah, 2011)   
 
Within this floor and ceiling, leaders will be motivated to act in two ways, based on choice or character, 
otherwise known as rule following and identify conferring (Kekes, 1984; Jennings & Hannah, 2011).  If a 
leader is rule following, he will act within the established guidelines set forth in order to avoid exclusion 
from the group or punishment.  (Jones & Ryan, 1997; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990).  Identify conferring 
motivation drives individuals to meet goals established by the individual, which are developed by the 
group norms.  (Lord and Brown, 2004 & Jennings and Hannah, 2011)   
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In this case, the moral floor and ceiling for leaders is understood.  The bare minimum is adherence to 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and executing task they are ordered to perform.  The ceiling is living 
the Army Values and being a professional in the military.  The motivation set forth in achieving ensuring 
soldier welfare is less clear.  Leaders may do the bare minimum in order to check the blocks and avoid 
punishment (Rule Following) or they may want to take care of their soldiers because their intrinsic goal 
is to be a good leader, and the group norms have established ensuring soldier welfare as a requirement 
to be a good leader (Identity Conferring) 
.   
Question 4:  How do you prevent low-risk soldiers from becoming high-risk soldiers? 
 
For this we will first utilize the medical issues discussed earlier.  The Army identifies five major drivers of 
health related issues.  These are post-traumatic stress, mild traumatic brain injury, depression, 
substance abuse, and stress.  In order to prevent low-risk soldiers from becoming high-risk, leaders must 
attempt to mitigate these issues whenever possible.   
 
Health Related Issues 
Post-Traumatic Stress has been a significant problem due to the rate of deployments of soldiers. 
Although deployments have slowed, there is always the potential for another operation.  Due to this, an 
understanding of what can be done to mitigate the effects of post-traumatic stress must be understood 
and implemented at the company level.  Research has found that benefit finding and supportive 
leadership are linked to a decrease in PTSD.  (Mental Health Advisory Team, 2009; Wood, Foran, Britt, 
Wright, 2011)   
 
Cohesion has also been linked to a decrease in combat stress.  The Army defines cohesion as “ During 
World War II, a comparison of the losses due to combat stress during heavy combat between two units 
who trained as a unit (82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne Divisions) and two units who were rapidly 
mobilized and pushed into combat (85th and 91st Infantry Divisions). The comparison is shown in Table 2 
below: (Madden, 2001 
)   
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Table 2:  Combat Casualties During WWII
10
 
Unit WIA 
Losses due to 
Combat Stress 
% 
85th Infantry Division 3600 917 22.7% 
91st Infantry Division 2700 919 34.0% 
82nd Airborne Division 4197 238 5.7% 
101st Airborne Division 4992 100 2.0% 
 
There are limitations on what leaders can do to limit mild traumatic brain injury outside of ensuring 
safety measures are put in place to limit the impacts of brain injury (protective gear, etc.) and limiting 
the opportunities for soldiers to be placed in situations where brain injury may occur.  The mission often 
dictates actions, and therefore, some dangers cannot be completely prevented.  Therefore it is critical 
for leaders to know what to do if brain injury occurs.   
 
Depression is impossible to prevent if the soldier enters the Army already suffering from the disorder.  
Although there is nothing leadership can do to prevent depression, it can increase the general well-
being of a soldier in which a component of well-being is depression.  (U.S. Army, 2012, HDF; Bliese & 
Halverson, 1996) Well-being is negatively related to work hours, and positively related to vertical and 
horizontal cohesion.  Work hours as a variable is self-explanatory.   Vertical cohesion is the perception of 
the subordinate that their leader is caring and competent.  Horizontal cohesion is how member of the 
group bond with others within the group.  This study utilizes these key relationships in order to analyze 
how soldier welfare is managed at the company level.  (Bliese & Halverson, 1996)  Therefore, company 
leaders must focus on soldier well-being to aid in the prevention of issues due to depression.  They are 
not professionals who are capable of providing treatment of the condition.  The ability to ensure soldiers 
who are suffering from depression are identified and provided professional assistance will be discussed 
in the identification and mitigation questions.   
 
The next issue, which leaders at the company level have an impact on is the level of stress the soldier 
feels.  Utilizing the Army stressor strands, the unit is extremely influential in the mitigation of these 
stressors.   At the unit level, the unit is responsible for ensuring a soldier is adequately trained for 
                                                          
10
 Madden, R.W. (2001). Living on the Edge: Building Cohesion and the Will to Win. Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, 
pg. 59. 
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combat operations, effectively utilized during operations, prepared for redeployment, integrated back 
into garrison life, provided a predictable schedule while in garrison, and provided worthwhile training in 
the absence of deployment orders.  At the soldier strand level, the unit must focus on integration when 
a soldier arrives to the unit, provide the individual regular and beneficial feedback through counseling, 
prepare for positions of additional responsibility, punish if required, and ultimately manage the career of 
the soldier.  Finally, the unit must assist the soldier in the family or personal strand.  The unit must reach 
out to families to provide information in order to decreases stressors at home and assist with other 
stressors the individual is not prepared for such as financial training and relationship stress.    
 
The next issue, substance abuse, can be identified as a health issue, but also a discipline issue.  First as a 
health related issue.  Alcohol is often used as a stress reliever (Dolan & Ender, 2008) and has been tied 
to depression and post-traumatic stress.  (Quello, Brady, & Sonne, 2005) therefore the prevention of 
PTSD, stress, and depression discussed above would likely have an impact on the prevention of 
substance abuse.  In order to prevent substance abuse, the prevention of other health related issues are 
likely to assist.   
 
Disciplinary Issues 
At the same time the substance abuse must also be addressed in the same manner as other disciplinary 
issues.  This is linked to military ethic as discussed earlier.  Soldiers must understand the consequences 
of their actions (rule following), but ideally, aspire to be a “good soldier” align with group norms 
(Identity Conferring).  Leaders are critical in establishing group norms which drive the actions of 
individuals within the group. (Jennings & Hannah, 2011) As these norms are adopted by the group, they 
continue to reinforce themselves and individuals within the group act in a certain manner and others 
who join the group begin to learn the behavior.  Subordinates will begin to align their actions with the 
actions of the leader.  Therefore it is crucial for leaders to demonstrate model behavior and 
subordinates will in turn follow. (Jennings & Hannah, 2011)  At the company level, who do not identify 
with the group must be made aware of and understand there will be consequences to any actions 
outside of the established rules.  For individuals who do identify with the group, it is critical for the 
leader to establish and reinforce model behaviors, aligned with the desired morality and the Army 
Values.   
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In addition to this, horizontal cohesion was found to have a positive relationship with respect to the 
prevention of disciplinary issues.  (Skull, 1990).  The study found the units with a higher level of 
horizontal cohesion was found to have a positive relationship with soldiers demonstrating mutual caring 
and assistance, assisting in disciplinary issues, such as trying to get an AWOL soldier to return, 
discouragement of drug use, and support to prevent degenerative behaviors.  Therefore, besides 
modeling positive behaviors, leaders should also foster horizontal cohesion to prevent issues.  
 
Summary 
The common theme throughout the prevention of these issues is cohesion.  The relationship between 
the leader and the subordinate is critical in the prevention of post-traumatic stress, depression, stress, 
substance abuse and disciplinary issues.   In addition to the relationship between the leader and the 
subordinate, the relationship between subordinates (horizontal cohesion) is critical in preventing high-
risk soldiers.  Finally, the hours worked and stressors encountered by soldiers are critical in the soldier 
well-being.  These can all be impacted by leaders at the company level.   
 
Question 5:  How do you identify potential high-risk soldiers and what difficulties do you face? 
 
There are four potential sources of identification of soldier issues.  These are soldier self-reporting, 
leader identification, friend identification, and family identification.  Each of these identification 
methods possesses its own unique challenges, primarily revolving around tensions felt by individuals 
reporting information.  Ideally, each individual possesses the self-awareness to identify issues and seek 
help, but this is often not the case.  This is why it is critical to have leaders, concerned for the best 
interest of the soldier and more knowledgeable about services which can be rendered to identify high-
risk soldiers.  
 
The first and likely most accurate source of information of a soldier’s welfare is the soldier himself.  If a 
soldier requires assistance, but does not know where to go, he can approach his leader for assistance.  
Although this may seem simple, it likely requires vertical cohesion.  The soldier must have confidence in 
and loyalty to their leaders, and vice versa.  If this is the case, soldiers may be more likely to provide 
personal information to the leader because the subordinate is confident in the capabilities of the leader 
to help and trusts the leader will be loyal and unnecessarily share personal information.  (Morale and 
Cohesion In Military Psychiatry – Manning)  Further complicating is potential concerns about privacy.  A 
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solider may trust his immediate supervisor, but is concerned if his name is provided higher up the chain 
of command or is put on a roster to be reported outside of the leaders the individual trusts.    
 
The next is the leader identifying issues with a soldier through involvement and caring.  These are also 
factors which are associated with vertical cohesion. (Skull, 1990) What we learned from COHORT).  If a 
leader knows his soldiers well, he can identify changes in their behaviors or attitudes.  At the same time, 
there must be a training process in place to assist leaders in being able to identify a change in attitude, 
behavior, or circumstances surrounding the soldier into a potential issue which needs to be addressed.   
 
A third potential source of information is the other soldiers within the unit.  Again, this is complicated.  
Soldiers often look to one another for social support. (Dolan & Ender, 2008) Due to this, soldiers may be 
aware of issues other soldiers face.  Despite this, it may be difficult for leaders to have friends come 
forward about other soldier’s issues.  First, off due to horizontal cohesion, soldiers may attempt to help 
other soldiers without involving the leader.  Second, it does not only require vertical cohesion between 
the friend and the leader, it also depends on the friend’s perception of the vertical cohesion between 
the soldier who is having problems and the leader.  This is a complicated relationship and soldiers may 
not want to be involved.   
 
The final source is family and friends outside of the unit.  First, there must be a channel of 
communication between the soldier’s social network and leaders.  The leader must be actively engaged 
in boundary spanning.  Boundary spanning consists of the efforts the unit makes to coordinate efforts 
and manage relationships outside of the unit. (Marrone, 2010)  A majority of these efforts are likely 
through the Family Readiness Group (FRG).  These efforts are critical in not only establishing the link 
between leaders and social networks, but also building a relationship. If the social network fears there 
will be negative repercussions to their actions, they are unlikely to come forward with information.   
 
Question 6:  Once a soldier is identified as potential high-risk, what mitigation steps are taken? 
 
With respect to the six major risk areas discussed in Chapter 2, leaders are unlikely to be able to 
successfully assist a leader in every area with every problem.  Because of this, team boundary spanning, 
at the company level, is a critical element to success.  Team boundary spanning focuses on how leaders 
within the company connect with individuals or groups outside of the company in order coordinate 
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efforts or find information in order to meet soldier needs.  These activities are drivers of team 
performance and organizational innovation.  (Marrone, 2010).   
 
The first approach to boundary spanning is with support services available to assist soldiers.  As leaders 
gain familiarity with these support agencies, they will be able to rapidly provide quality information to 
soldiers in need.  Additionally, the more familiar leaders are with support personnel, the more likely 
they will refer soldiers who need assistance.  Finally, leaders will become more innovative in their 
solutions to soldier problems the more familiar they become with the available support agencies.   
Boundary spanning is not only with support services.  It is also important to reach out to family 
members when attempting to mitigate potential high-risk soldiers.  Many of the issues addressed, 
directly impact families.  Having familiarity and being able to reach out to individuals is vital in 
developing tailored solutions, specific to the individual soldier needs as well as garnering support from 
those who are closest to the soldier who is having problems.   
 
Question 7:  Following a high-risk event, how what considerations are taken during the response? 
 
When a soldier is involved in a high-risk event, leader attention is focused on the event and the 
circumstances surrounding the event.  The soldier is put into contact with appropriate support agencies 
and leadership determines what they believe is the appropriate response.  All situations are handled 
differently, some require medical attention, others disciplinary, or both.  While this is understood, the 
effects of the leadership decision in the response are critical with respect to organizational justice.  
Organizational justice revolves around the perceptions by employees that they are being treated in a fair 
manner. (Moorman, 1991) 
 
Within organizational justice, there are three categories.  The first is distributive justice which based on 
the appropriateness of the outcomes.  This breaks into the subcategories of equity of rewards based on 
contributions, equality of outcomes for each employee, and meeting specific needs based on individual 
situation.  The second category is procedural justice which is the suitability of the process.  This type of 
justice is built on consistency among employees, there is no bias, decisions accurate information is used, 
representation of concerned stakeholders, the opportunity for correction and ethical.  The final 
component is interactional justice which is the appropriateness of treatment received from authority.  
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Here individuals are treated with respect and relevant information is shared with others. (Cropanzana, 
Bowen, & Gilland, 2007) 
 
The fairness of response is critical for the long term sustainability of the program because it ties into the 
concept of organizational citizenship.    Organizational citizenship are the behaviors within an 
organization which are outside formal role requirements, where individuals assist others within the 
organization in order to support the other individuals or the organization, occasionally, at the 
individual’s expense.  (Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983)  Organizational justice has a direct effect on 
organizational citizenship behaviors.  If individuals believe there is organizational fairness, they are more 
likely to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors. (Messer and White, 2006, Moorman, 1991)  
 
This relationship is critical when determining an adequate response.  The first consideration must be the 
response to the specific high risk event.  If an individual is treated to harsh or light, other soldiers within 
the company may feel the soldier is not being treated fairly and as a result citizenship behaviors decline.  
In addition to the impacts on the soldier involved in the event, there may also be backlash against 
changes in policies and procedures in response to what soldiers feel is a specific and isolated event.   
 
Question 8:  What is done to ensure alignment in the company? 
 
In order to ensure alignment of within the organization, these behaviors need to become part of the 
organizational culture.  Culture is defined as “a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or 
developed by a given group, as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore is taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems”. (Schien, 1990, 
pg.111)   Culture is developed over time as a group works together.  It is formed around responses to 
critical incidents as members begin to identify with leaders.  As leaders initially assert their beliefs, and 
as the group identifies successes based on those beliefs, the culture begins to form.  (Schien, 1990) 
Initially, the leadership needs to ensure that all within the organization understand that soldier welfare 
is a leader task.  If a leader within the company does not believe high-risk soldiers are a leader’s 
responsibility, or is uncertain, there are three potential reasons:   
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 Higher level leaders do not prioritize high-risk soldier management as an important aspect of 
leadership. 
 The message may not be communicated adequately,  
 The command team does not demonstrate the need to care for soldiers within their command 
through their actions.   
 
The first failure discussed is aligned with a core Army leader task, which is to provide direction, 
guidance, and priorities.  (U.S. Army, Field Manual 6-22).  The direction provided by leaders is beneficial 
because it allows followers to identify options in order to achieve defined goals.  The ability of the 
command team to provide a clear, challenging, and consequential view of future provides three 
benefits; it energizes followers toward a common goal, it orients the followers in a certain direction in 
order to coordinate their actions with the organizations goals, and it engages the individuals to utilize 
their skills and abilities. (Hackman, 2002).  When leaders provide direction, members of the organization 
become more proactive and adaptive. (Griffin, Parker, & Mason, 2010)  When providing direction, 
leaders must focus on the ends, not the means, but provide limits in which members of the organization 
can operate between.  (Hackman, 2002)  These principles are similar to what is outlined in FM 6-0: 
Mission Command.  The command team must provide direction to leaders within the company in order 
to engage, energize, and orient onto a common goal of ensuring soldier welfare and discipline.  Once 
this is done, it is critical for the command team to allow leaders to act and provide coaching to leaders 
when necessary.   
 
The second potential failure is that the command team did not adequately communicate (U.S. Army, FM 
6-22) the established direction.  A potential cause of this is a failure to secure organizational 
commitment through a shared vision.   In order to assist in gaining acceptance of members of the 
organization, the command team should consult with members of the organization to secure 
commitment (Hackman, 2002).  If the vision and direction is held only by the command team, it is 
unlikely to mobilize the organization for action.  (Senge, 1990)  For example, if the command team fails 
to secure the commitment of platoon leaders in acceptance of the direction of the company, this will 
unlikely flow down to the squad leaders and soldiers in the squads.  Another potential cause of a 
communication failure is an unclear direction which does not provide a clear sense of what must be 
accomplished.  A “tangible” image which is both real but aspiring is required to ensure understanding is 
known within the organization.  (Collins, 1991)  The final reason for a failure in communication is a lack 
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of captivation in the message which excites individuals within the organization to take action.  (Dessler, 
1999)  
 
The final potential failure is the failure to “lead by example”. (FM 6-22 pg. 7-1).  Assuming subordinate 
leaders look at the command team as successful individuals, they will look to them as examples of 
positive behaviors and may attempt to learn from and emulate their actions in order to improve.  
(Wood, 1989)  Therefore, if the command team fails to communication their expectations of the 
members within the organization, they need to demonstrate this direction through their actions.   
 
In order to be truly successful, all three are needed.  If direction is established and is communicated, but 
not demonstrated by the command team, they will be looked upon as hypocrites and lose support.  If 
direction is established and demonstrated, but not communicated, there may be some confusion with 
respect to the rationale behind the motives and therefore the actions may not fully be understood.  
Therefore, with respect to soldier welfare and discipline, expectations must be established, 
communicated, and demonstrated in order to ensure leader understanding throughout the command. 
Once this direction is established, culture is also created based on the organizations response to critical 
events.  It is reinforced by leaders through the organizational structure, policies and procedures, cultural 
artifacts.  It is also preserved with the entry of new members through the socialization process in the 
organization.  (Schien, 1990)  
 
Question 9:  What programs/processes/training do you identify with soldier health and welfare?   
 
This question looks to identify the specific programs, processes, and training performed at the company 
level.  This is to be compared to the programs outlined in Chapter 2.  This question hopes to identify if 
leaders are looking at all the programs holistically, or considers specific programs unique to soldier 
health and welfare.   
 
Question 10:  What would you do to ensure all potential high-risk soldiers are identified and high-risk 
events are eliminated? 
 
This allows respondents to discuss anything that has been missed and provide specific input on what 
could be done to improve the company’s performance.   
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3.5 Summary 
The company is a complex system, or enterprise.  There are a series of complex exchanges between 
leaders, subordinates, and outside groups which are critical to ensure soldier well-being.  In order to 
manage these exchanges, there must be a robust series of processes and procedures ensuring soldiers 
are being cared for.  This chapter provides the understanding of the enterprise and identifies the 
questions to be answered to fully understand how the enterprise operates.  Once answered, a better 
understanding of the shortcomings of the system can be identified and solutions can be developed.   
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Chapter 4 – Results 
The interviews were conducted with multiple company level leaders.  These individuals recently held 
positions of Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Platoon Leader, First Sergeant, and Company Commander 
ranging from 2011 to the present.  There were many trends that emerged from these interviews which 
will be discussed below.   
4.1 Definition of High Risk Soldiers  
The two questions were developed to understand the mental model of leaders with respect to high-risk 
soldiers and the responsibilities of leaders.  Although leaders could not recite the definition of high-risk 
soldiers verbatim, but they all provided a similar definition.  There was little delineation between 
potential high-risk and high-risk.  For the most part, they are lumped together in the general term high-
risk soldier.  Soldiers were labeled as high-risk for a “full gamut” of issues.  These issues include to, but 
aren’t limited to difficulties coping with being away from home, difficulties in making sound decisions, 
skydiving, substance abuse, family problems, etc.  While this broad definition ensures leaders are 
attempting to identify nearly any issue affecting soldier welfare, it is also likely to be a time consuming 
event, with many soldiers considered high-risk, despite likely variation in the magnitude of the issues.   
4.2 Critical Leaders at the Company Level 
As far as the leaders were responsible, there were differing opinions.    The most common response for 
who is responsible is company commanders because commanders are responsible that everything that 
happens within the company.  Company commanders ultimately drive the priorities within the 
company.  If the commander prioritizes soldier welfare and puts systems in place to ensure soldiers are 
being taken care of, it is more likely to occur.  This is a rational assumption in a hierarchical organization 
like a company.  While it is understood that the commander sets the conditions for success for the unit, 
it is also realized that it is impractical for the commander to be the sole executor of the soldier welfare 
programs and others must assist.   
 
Much of the implementation and execution of the program is on first line supervisors, primarily squad 
leaders.  Many of the leaders interviewed identified squad leaders as the critical link in ensuring the 
well-being of soldiers.  This is due to the fact they have the most day to day contact, and ideally, the 
closest relationship with the soldiers within the leadership structure.  Leaders placed a strong emphasis 
on regular contact as a critical factor in identification of soldier issues.  Interestingly, some leaders did 
not place responsibility on the squad leaders because they did not feel they were equipped to handle 
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many of the situations they would encounter.  This provides an interesting insight of some of the issues 
facing leaders at the company level.  Ideally squad leaders are responsible for high risk soldiers due to 
their proximity to soldiers, but not all are prepared for the duties imposed upon them for a multitude of 
reasons.  This highlights the need for additional professional development requirements for junior 
leaders, particularly with respect to soldier welfare.  
  
There were additional responses as well, but not as common.  The first to discuss is the unit first 
sergeant.  Many leaders view the first sergeant as the primary role model for enlisted soldiers within the 
unit.  Although the company commander is ultimately responsible, there is a perception that soldiers 
can more easily relate to the first sergeant.  Due to this, cohesion between the commander and first 
sergeant is seen as critical to ensure there is a unified direction for the company, and not a culture of 
“officers vs. NCOs”.  Another interesting dynamic is the proper role for the first sergeant.  One squad 
leader stated that the best first sergeants know that first sergeants “should no longer take the role of 
the enforcer as it has always been.  He is the liaison to his Soldiers.”  While it is unlikely that first 
sergeants will no longer play a role in the discipline of soldiers, there needs to be a balanced approach.  
First sergeants need to be an honest and responsible broker to ensure the all soldiers within the 
command are treated fairly and with respect.  If a soldier perceives he is not being treated fairly or with 
respect by the squad or platoon leadership, the soldier needs to be able to trust the first sergeants to 
assist.  Without this, soldiers may feel there is no one to help at the company level and may not be 
comfortable asking for help from leaders outside of the unit.  Therefore the critical role for the first 
sergeant with respect to soldier welfare is to establish a safe environment for soldiers to seek assistance 
and to work with the commander in establishing and implementing the priorities and direction of the 
company.   
 
Finally, the other leaders mentioned were the platoon leader and platoon sergeant.  While not as 
important in the macro level as commander or first sergeant, or as important at the micro level as squad 
leaders, they act as the bridge between the company leadership and the squad leadership.  They are 
often the ones to communicate the intent of the commander to the lower levels, have more experience 
and maturity than many squad leaders, and therefore provide guidance and assistance to these leaders.  
The primary purpose for the platoon leadership is to provide assistance to squad leaders in ensuring 
soldiers is taken care of.   
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The lack of a consistently similar answer is important because it demonstrates that it is not up to a single 
leader to ensure soldier welfare.   It is truly a team effort requiring all levels of leadership.  The 
command team must provide create an environment which supports and develops junior leaders, 
establishes a culture where it is soldier welfare is important and develop systems to ensure tasks 
associated with soldier welfare are executed.  Platoon leadership must implement the systems and 
support the culture established by the command team as well as provide necessary assistance to squad 
leaders.  Finally, squad leaders must build relationships with soldiers based on caring and trust in order.   
4.3 Opinions on Leader Responsibility 
The motivation of leaders with respect to soldier well-being is somewhat mixed.  Leaders do not like 
being involved in personal matters of soldiers, but want to help because they care about the soldiers as 
people and it considered part of their job as leaders.  Therefore, leaders do not want to be involved, but 
they ensure they are.   
 
A majority of leaders discussed the fact that they want to help their soldiers because they care about 
them as people, and want to see them succeed.  One commander said his soldiers were “like his kids” 
because of the strong bond and sense of responsibility he held for them.  Multiple other leaders had a 
similar perspective during this discussion.  Despite their general reluctance to be involved in personal 
issues, they would if it meant ensuring the well-being of the soldier.  This demonstrates the power of 
vertical cohesion, and it is not unidirectional from subordinate to leader, but it is bidirectional from 
leader to led and led to leader.   
 
While leaders felt responsible for helping soldiers, it was often conditional.  The primary condition 
placed on this sense of responsibility was that the soldier who needed help needed to care as well.  
There is a significant time requirement imposed on leaders when assisting soldiers and leaders do not 
want to utilize their time on individuals who don’t care.  Again this can be a byproduct of vertical 
cohesion.  The leader does not feel the loyalty or sense of commitment from the soldier who needs 
assistance, and therefore does not want to utilize limited resources on this individual.  This can become 
a reinforcing degradation of vertical cohesion when an event occurs, the leader perceives the soldier to 
be uncaring, therefore does not want to utilize resources on the individual, and the leader is then seen 
as uncaring which leads to more issues.  This continues until the individual is no longer part of the unit. 
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There also seems to be some natural tensions from leaders with respect to the morality of obligation 
and aspiration.  Many leaders feel obligated to meet the requirements placed on them such as 
completion of SLLRT and high-risk matrix. This ties into the morality of obligation as discussed before.  
Individuals do what their duty is.  They understand that a checklist of questions to ask soldiers is not the 
best way to learn and successful leaders can achieve the same or better effects through other means 
but may not have the resources or abilities to do this, or train leaders in their unit to do it.  Here 
morality of aspiration is utilized because people want to do well, and they are driven to perform the 
actions of good leaders.   Therefore, they settle for meeting the requirements set upon them and hope 
that leaders within the unit will take the extra step on their own.   
 
The difficulty lies in determining the motivation of these leaders.  There may be some bias in these 
answers due to the desire to appear as more caring.  A more robust interview process would be required 
in order to accurately gauge the underlying motivations of leaders, but this provides insights to the 
actions leaders take.  For example, a leader utilizes the SLLRT because it is perceived as a mandatory 
requirement.  It is difficult to parse out if the leader is performing the action because he is rule 
following, or because it is identify conferring.  Ultimately it can be both.  In order to avoid negative 
repercussions a leader can utilize the SLLRT and meet the requirement.  If the SLRRT becomes the group 
norm and the leader judges the completion of the SLRRT as a requirement to become a quality leader, 
the SLRRT is then identify conferring.   
 
When vertical cohesion is present, leaders naturally want to take care of their subordinates.  This seems 
to be internalized in the leaders as a cultural norm within the Army.  With this being said, the absence of 
vertical cohesion, there is limited desire on the part of leaders to help soldiers through their issues.  
These leaders relate ensuring soldier welfare as a quality of a solid leader, but did not feel all leaders 
saw it this way.  These leaders who did not ensure soldier welfare were viewed as toxic leaders, only 
caring about mission accomplishment that did not care about the welfare of their subordinates.  
Therefore, it is critical to foster vertical cohesion within units and to train leaders to better relate with 
subordinates.  
4.4 Maintaining Low-Risk Soldiers 
This was an area of weakness during the interviews.  A majority of the responses focused on 
identification and mitigation, which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.  Leaders 
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were unable to readily associate the benefits of cohesion in the prevention of conditions such as PTSD, 
stress, and substance abuse.  The discussions on cohesion normally related to the ability to identify 
issues, or to have a soldier come forward with issues. 
 
With this being said, there were indirect references to cohesion as a driving force maintaining low-risk 
soldiers.  There was some discussion that the unit culture and command climate had on impacting 
soldiers and their well-being.  Leaders felt that there is a direct relationship the unit culture and climate 
and the number of high-risk soldiers.  This relationship was likely mediated by cohesion established by 
the unit culture and climate.  The culture and climate foster a sense of cohesion, and as long as group 
norms were aligned with soldier welfare, there were a decrease in issues at the company level.   
Once these soldiers began to identify with the unit, and positive norms were established, the message 
could shift from ‘here are the rules, make sure you follow them’, the message now became, ‘you know 
what’s right, keep up the good work.’  This slight shift in messaging is important because the message 
was no longer rule following, it was identity conferring.  This reinforces the mutual trust between 
leaders and subordinates and appeals to the soldier’s sense of professionalism and desire to be a good 
soldier and member of the team.    
 
This is continued to be reinforced through horizontal cohesion.  Soldiers, who became friends at work, 
became friends outside of work.  Therefore the norms established at the unit level, may follow to the 
social level, continuing to minimize issues.  Despite the positive effects of horizontal cohesion at the 
company level, it may create other issues, if the soldier has a family.  The cohesion at the unit level may 
create a tension between the soldier and family members.   
 
Again, cohesion is important, but it is not necessarily recognized as a critical aspect.  The leaders 
interviewed did not recognize cohesion as a source of improving soldier welfare.  There was recognition 
that units which were considered “good” were less likely to have problems with high-risk soldiers.  This 
was often attributed to unit culture, command climate, and cohesion depending on the individual.  The 
inability to specifically identify cohesion positive driver of soldier welfare could be for a multitude of 
reasons.  Some are provided below: 
 
 Lack of education or training on the benefits of cohesion   
 Inability to measure cohesion 
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 Lack of command focus on developing cohesion 
 Belief that cohesion may only develop naturally, and therefore cannot be forced 
 Inability to attribute cohesion to soldiers remaining low-risk 
 Lack of importance of cohesion in evaluations and awards 
 
Unit cohesion is a critical factor in the prevention of high-risk events, but it may not be well understood 
by leaders.  It is unlikely it will be immediately recognized until some of the factors identified are 
addressed though training and incentive structure.   
4.5 Identification of High-Risk Soldiers 
The identification of high-risk soldiers is the primary focus of leader action at the company level.  A 
majority of the interviews were focused on identification.  A key element identified by leaders is the 
relationship between the leader and the subordinate.  Without a positive relationship, leaders cannot 
identify issues because they do not know the soldier, and at the same time, soldiers need to trust 
leaders with personal information.  Leaders also paid significant attention to the process of identifying 
high-risk soldiers and the tools and trackers utilized.   
4.5.1 Identifiers 
First, the primary sources of identification leaders utilize are soldiers self-reporting and leader 
identifying an issue.  These were seen as the most reliable sources.  There was some skepticism on 
utilizing friends or family as a primary identifier of information.  Friends could not be trusted as a 
reliable source of information because most leaders did not expect them to come forward.  If they were 
able to receive information, it was usually valid, but there are difficulties in having soldiers come 
forward.  A majority of leaders believed soldiers did not come forward about problems another soldier is 
having because they did not want to be labeled as a “snitch” or a “rat”.  This is an understandable 
scenario and difficult for leaders to change.  Instead of relying on other soldiers as a source of 
identification, it was recommended to use them as an additional source of support for potential high-
risk soldiers, a byproduct of horizontal cohesion.  Any identification from other soldiers should be 
considered a bonus.  
 
Many leaders had concerns with using family members as sources of identification as well.  Opinions 
were varied based on their previous experiences.  Some leaders had positive results with family member 
identification.  More often, leaders had negative experiences with family members.  This is primarily 
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because it turns into an investigation on the part of the leader, often turning into a “he said, she said” 
scenario with the leader attempting to find the truth somewhere in the middle.  The leaders with 
successes with family members as identifiers did not have this scenario as the soldiers readily admitted 
to the problems their spouses brought forward.  Leaders should utilize family members as a source, but 
again, should not rely on it as a primary source of identification, only a bonus.   
4.5.2 Drivers of Identification Focus 
As mentioned above, the primary focus of leaders is identification.  There are multiple drivers of this 
based on insights gained during the interviews.  While identification is critical because issues will arise, it 
seemingly consumes the efforts of leaders, leading to the neglect of prevention and mitigation.  At the 
same time, prevention is seen as synonymous with identification.  The general assumption seems to be 
is that if an individual is identified, an incident is unlikely to occur.  Below are some of the drivers: 
 
1. Identification is Tangible:  A leader can judge success or failure on the identification of a high-
risk soldier.  High-risk soldiers identified can be counted and judged as a part of being a “good 
leader.” 
2. SLLRT:  Many of the leaders interviewed discussed the SLLRT extensively.  While the Army 
advertises it as a “tool” to assist leaders, it has morphed into a requirement for many units.  
3. High-Risk Matrix:  This is a reporting too used to track the soldiers who are considered high-risk 
in a unit.  This now creates a reporting requirement for units.  Units now must attempt to 
identify soldiers with issues in order populate the high-risk matrix.   
4. Situational Awareness for Leaders:  There was a general perception that bosses do not like 
surprises.  Therefore leaders focus on identification in case of an issue so surprises do not show 
up on the blotter report.   
5. Places the Onus on Soldier, not Leader:  If the soldier is identified as high-risk and counseled, 
many leaders felt they would no longer be held responsible for a soldier’s actions.   
6. Quantitative Focus for Incentives:  Evaluations and Awards are full of quantitative data therefore 
there is a natural inclination collection of data and numbers for comparisons.  
 
Ultimately, this drive to identify high-risk soldiers may exacerbate other issues.  If a soldier feels he is 
being interrogated because the leader needs to check the blocks on the SLRRT, the soldier can easily 
game the system to be identified as low risk.  If the soldier does not want to be added to a roster full of 
high-risk soldiers, he is unlikely to be honest.  This problem was identified in the Red Book, but there has 
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been little done to address it.  If soldiers perceive leaders are being invasive for the sake of reporting, 
there is likely to be a decrease in cohesion and problems.  Therefore, it may be more important for 
leaders to focus on building cohesion than it is to complete questionnaires and to fill out matrices.   
4.6 Mitigation 
Leaders are cognizant of their limitations in providing soldier care.  They realize they are not mental 
health providers, financial consultants, or social workers.  Therefore, there has been significant attention 
paid to boundary spanning, and ensuring soldiers who need assistance outside of the scope the chain of 
command can provide are referred to the right providers.  Leaders stated the general ease at which they 
can find providers.  Worst case scenario, they need to make a few phone calls in order to coordinate.  
Despite this, there are a few challenges.  There appears to be a general perception that once a soldier is 
referred to a provider, the leader can then abdicate responsibility of the soldier’s problem.  Many 
leaders discussed successes getting soldiers to the right provider, they were less likely to discuss follow 
up and ensuring the soldier follows a plan of action provided by the provider.  Leaders appear to lose 
visibility on the issue once referred to a provider.  It seems as if there is some room for enhanced 
coordination between leaders and providers.  For example, a soldier with financial issues may see a 
counselor.  The leader may assume the counselor is now responsible for assisting the soldier.  At the 
same time, the counselor assumes he just needs to assist in the plan of action and is not concerned with 
follow up.  The soldier financial issue may or may not be solved, but each party, the leader and the 
counselor assume it complete.  There is room for enhanced coordination and understanding of the 
responsibilities of the counselor and leader to be gained.   
 
Additionally, there are still significant issues with communication between providers and the chain of 
command.  One commander told a story of a soldier who committed suicide in his unit.  The chain of 
command identified the soldier with an issue and the soldier was referred to behavioral health and was 
seeing a provider.  Ultimately the soldier shared some information with the provider, which the 
command did not know about, and therefore could help the soldier with.  The provider did not alert the 
chain of command to all the issues surrounding the soldier.  The commander feels that they may have 
been able to provide more assistance to the soldier if they had more complete knowledge, but they did 
not because it was protected by HIPPA.  If leaders are expected to be held responsible for the actions of 
individuals within their unit, this patient protection makes it more difficult.   
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4.7 Response 
Leader feedback in the response phase revolved around the ramifications on the group following a high-
risk event instead of the perception of fairness in punishment on the soldier, as initially designed in the 
questions.  The response phase is a highly charged period which requires significant leader resources to 
manage.  Additionally, there are often perceived overreactions to events that are felt outside of the unit 
in which the incident occurred.   
 
For example, one lieutenant discussed a professional development session with the unit’s brigade 
commander following a string of high-risk events in the brigade.  The leader did not feel it was very 
effective because it was a one-time training session in response to incidents.  If it was part of a continual 
series of professional development sessions, he would have been open to it.  This leader felt that a 
PowerPoint class is unlikely to be a beneficial source of professional development.   
 
Another leader spoke of the requirement to update SLLRT questionnaires in his battalion following any 
incident.  This eliminates and preconceived notion that the SLLRT is a tool, and becomes a requirement 
for leaders to accomplish.   
 
Another company commander discussed the crush of requirements placed upon the commander during 
following an event.  Because of the significant reporting requirements to battalion and brigade, the 
junior leaders are essentially pushed out of the way, and the commander becomes directly involved in 
the situation.  This has multiple effects.  First the company commander is no longer able to perform any 
duties.  Additionally, it sends a message to junior leaders that they are not competent, and need 
someone to do their job for them.  Neither is beneficial in the long term to the unit.   
4.8 Alignment within the Company 
As stated earlier, the culture and climate established by the command team are critical drivers of soldier 
health and welfare systems at the company level.  Leaders paid particular notice on the actions of 
leaders, more than the words of leaders.  Leaders saying that taking care of soldiers is important are 
common throughout the military, what soldiers need to see are actions supporting the claims. 
Due to this, communication of the message is not as important as the prioritization of high-risk soldier 
management by provision of resources and the demonstration of caring by leaders.  One of the primary 
examples of prioritization by leaders is high-risk synchronization meetings at the battalion level.  One 
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commander discussed the value in these meeting for a few reasons.  The simple fact it is a scheduled 
meeting demonstrates the importance the battalion commander places on the meeting.  The high-risk 
meeting is a forcing function for leaders to ensure they are involved with subordinates.  Additionally it 
ensures leaders have an understanding of their soldiers’ issues.  It also provides leaders the ability to 
share information and lessons learned with other leaders.  This forces the company commander to do 
the same at the company level, which has the same effect down the chain of command.   
 
Another vital aspect is to lead by example.  One captain discussed his development as a leader when he 
was a young lieutenant.  He did not regularly interact with soldiers outside of required interactions for 
work related purposes.  He modeled his behavior off of the company commander who did not engage 
with soldiers on a regular basis.  When commanders switched, the new commander was more outgoing 
and would engage soldiers more often and informally.  He noticed the positive effects of these 
interactions and began to model his behavior off of the new commander’s behavior.  He found this to be 
beneficial in building relationships with soldiers, or vertical cohesion.   
4.9 Programs at the Company Level 
Although there are multiple programs which relate to soldier health and welfare, many leaders do not 
connect the dots.  When asked about the programs, most leaders could name one or two programs, but 
most did not view the multiple programs the army provides as being important to soldier welfare.  Many 
of these programs are considered independent programs and not a holistic approach to ensure soldier 
welfare.   
 
Most leaders feel that many of the programs are beneficial; they wish the training was more efficient.  
For example, 350-1 training is almost universally viewed in a “check the block” manner.  In order to 
meet all requirements and save time, units do mass training sessions using power point slides in order to 
meet requirements.  Although leaders understand these training events have some value, they realize 
the method of presentation is flawed, and is therefore not worth putting a significant amount of effort 
into, when they have other requirements which are viewed as more vital to their success.   
 
Although they feel there are too many programs, some important programs which are not as easy to 
institute, such as counseling suffer.  It was nearly universal that counseling was important to develop 
soldiers; unfortunately, many individuals did not feel that counseling was prioritized.  Quality counseling 
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takes time to develop and quality counseling session take more time.  Almost no leaders had time 
dedicated in training schedules to counseling.  An example training schedule is provided in Appendix F.  
This increases the perception that it is not as important as other things.   
4.10 Other Issues Identified 
Outside of the answers to specific questions, other related issues were also identified during the 
interviews.  These are important to truly identify dynamics of the entire system.   
4.10.1 Operational Focus 
A common theme throughout the interviews there is a divided between operations and soldier welfare 
within units.  The leadership of a unit is what begins to shape the culture of the organization.  Many 
interviewers discussed the spectrum in which a leader can operate.  On one side of the spectrum is 
operational focus.  Here a leader is focused on accomplishing the mission regardless of the impact on 
soldier welfare.  On the opposing end of the spectrum, are leaders who are primarily focused on the 
welfare of soldiers, and therefore may not meet all operational tasks because they feel it will come at 
the expense of soldier welfare.  The perception is that the truly talented leaders can balance both in 
order to maximize operational effectiveness, and at the same time, ensure the welfare of soldiers within 
the unit, but they are the exception and not the norm.  This phenomenon also been identified in the 
yellow book.   
4.10.2 Quantitative and Short Term Incentive Structure 
One of the primary drivers of this behavior is that in order to be qualified as a good leader, you must 
have the data to back it up.  Evaluations and awards are littered with quantitative data judging how 
effective a leader is.  Some of these examples include number of rounds safely fired, number of safety 
violations, number of soldiers promoted, etc.  Therefore, a primary driver of individual behavior is to be 
able to quantitatively demonstrate things that were accomplished.  This is easy to do operationally.  This 
is far more difficult with respect to a more qualitative assessment of climate and morale.  It is much 
easier for a promotion board panel to judge a squad leader who ‘expertly led 500 patrols in a highly 
contested area of operation’ than it is to judge a squad leader who ‘fostered a high level of cohesion’ in 
his squad.   
 
Another critical aspect of the operational focus is the short term benefits to operational effectiveness.  If 
a leader steps in and is effective, it will likely benefit the leader on the next evaluation.  On the other 
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hand, much of the benefits of insuring soldier welfare are invisible (prevention of events from 
occurring), or are long-term (developing quality leaders for another commander) and therefore will not 
help the leader immediately.  If the leader is put under time and resource constraints, operational 
effectiveness will become the priority at the expense of soldier welfare activities whose benefits will not 
affect the current leader.   
4.10.3 Lack of Leader Development 
A common theme throughout the interviews is the lack of adequately prepared leaders at the squad 
level.  Most individuals agreed that many of the junior leaders lack the expertise and maturity to 
adequately ensure the welfare of soldiers within the command.  Despite this, there seems to be limited 
efforts to develop these leaders.  First, many perceive the Army professional military education courses 
as insufficient.  Therefore, there is a pressure for leader development to be conducted at the company 
level, but it is not being prioritized.  Self-development is difficult as well because many junior soldiers 
are not disciplined enough to attempt to professionally develop on their own and many are incentivized 
to take college courses instead of focus on their development as leaders in their own time for achieve 
both personal and professional goals.   
4.10.4 Absence of Mission Command 
There is a general feeling that mission command is for deployments and does not apply to garrison.  The 
flood of requirements, combined with the limitations of time in a week, create the impression that if it is 
important, someone will tell the leaders at the company level to execute.  Therefore, many leaders wait 
for instructions and initiative is stifled.  Company level leaders are continually told that they do not 
understand ‘garrison leadership’ and therefore they wait for directions from those who ‘understand’.  
This creates a cultural clash between leaders who have only known the high-optempo Army of the past 
13 years, and the senior leaders who spent much of their company level time in the garrison centric 
Army.  Many company leaders possess a cynical view of the intentions of higher level leaders.  Many 
company level leaders do not feel they possess autonomy decisions based on their intimate knowledge 
of their organization.   
 
Company level leaders feel there is a greater focus on tasks to complete than end states to achieve.  
Many units get overly focused on the mechanics of the processes instead of the objectives the processes 
accomplish.  This is particularly true with respect to high-risk soldiers.  Instead of focusing on the end 
state of ensuring the health and welfare of the soldiers within the unit, the focus is on the tasks to be 
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completed such as the SLLRT, High-Risk Counseling, and High-Risk Matrix.  This assumes that the 
completion of these processes will lead to the desired outcomes of the absence of incidents.  While 
these may be beneficial, the focus on these tasks may pull resources away from other programs which 
could be beneficial.  Unfortunately, leaders lack the ability to experiment with new approaches.  
Because of this, innovation within units suffers.  Leaders don’t have the time to develop new and 
innovative solutions to solve the high-risk soldier problem; they are just managing the current system of 
tasks.   
4.10.5 The Last Resort – The Safety Brief 
Every unit conducts a safety brief to attempt to influence soldier decision making over the weekend.  
Usually the commander will speak to the unit, and remind them to be safe.  Most safety briefs entail 
reminding soldiers to drink responsibly, not to engage in risky behaviors, and to look out for their 
friends.  While the speeches to not differ, the effects may be different, and that largely depends on the 
individuals within the unit’s perception of the commander.  The basic logic is if a soldier feels the 
commander cares for him during the week, he will assume that the commander also cares about him 
during the weekend and will listen.  Not all will follow, but it will likely register with the soldier.  On the 
other hand, if a soldier does not feel a commander cares about the soldier during the week, the 
commanders motives for the safety brief are selfish (want to stay off the blotter), and the soldier won’t 
pay attention.   
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Chapter 5 – Analysis 
With a better understanding of the design of the system (Chapters 2 and 3) and the actual performance 
of the system and the mental models of stakeholders within the model and analyze to help identify 
changes to policy which will have beneficial impacts throughout the system.  First we must gain a better 
understanding of the term policy resistance.   
5.1 Policy Resistance and Dynamic Complexity 
Analyzing the company as a complex system allows us to determine the second and third order effects 
of policy decisions. There are often unintended ramifications of even the most well intentioned policy 
measures.  These ramifications are known as policy resistance.  Policy resistance must not be confused 
with resistance to policy.  Resistance to policy is the opposition of a policy due to a multitude of reasons.  
Policy resistance provides an explanation of how the system adapts its behavior based on the strategies 
and programs implemented.  (Sterman, 2000)   
 
Policy resistance occurs when there is not a full understanding of the effects of decisions on the system.  
Many policy decisions are based on a linear perception of the world and events.  The Figure 13 below 
demonstrates an example. ((Sterman, 2000)    An example is the SLRRT.  The goal is to prevent soldiers 
from performing high-risk activities.  The situation is high-risk events are having an impact on the 
readiness of the force.  The problem is that junior leaders lack the ability to adequately identify high-risk 
soldiers and prevent high-risk activities.  The decision was then to assist these leaders by providing a 
tool, the SLRRT.  The desired results are decrease in events due to an increase in identification.  
 
Figure 13:  Liner Perspective
11
 
Policy resistance occurs when this linear model is followed, and does not account for additional 
feedbacks operating within the system.  A more robust example of the impacts of feedback is provided 
                                                          
11
 Sterman, J. D. (2000) Business dynamics: systems thinking and modeling for a complex wolrd (Vol. 19). Boston: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, pg 10. 
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below in Figure 14.  This is a far more complicated.  Goals impact decisions.  The decisions made create 
side effects, which along with the decisions impact the environment.  As the environment changes, the 
goals may change, as well as the goals and actions of others, continuing to change the environment.  
Due to these feedback loops, there may often be unintended consequences of decisions.  Relating this 
back to the SLRRT, it may still be a good idea, based on the earlier model, but its impact on the rest of 
the environment must be considered.  For example, a side effect may be that leaders view it as an 
additional task to be completed, impacting the environment in which they operate.  This may then 
change their goals to a process based approach and the accomplishment of tasks.  This leads to an 
“interrogation” instead of a conversation, which then impacts the relationship between the individual 
and the soldier, further changing the environment.  (Sterman, 2000) 
 
Figure 14:  Feedback Perspective
12
 
 
This phenomenon is known as dynamic complexity.  Complex behaviors arise from the multiple 
interactions between agents over time.  These effects are often amplified by delays.  These delays make 
it difficult to attribute the unanticipated effects of a policy.  Some of the characteristics of dynamic 
complexity include but are not limited the system’s ability to adapt, counter intuitiveness of outcomes, 
and policies are characterized by tradeoffs. (Sterman, 2000) 
                                                          
12
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5.2 Causal Loop Diagrams 
In order to model the feedbacks in the system described, a causal loop diagram will be utilized.  A causal 
loop diagram connects variables using arrows to describe how one variable influences the other.  A 
positive link indicates that an increase in the originating variable leads to an increase in the connected 
variable above what it would have been otherwise.  A negative link is the opposite.  An increase in the 
originating variable leads to a decrease in the connected variable below what it would have been 
otherwise.   
A simple example is described below analyzing population.  The first loop is the birth rate and 
population shown below.  The fractional birth rate is the birth rate in people per year.  As the birth rate 
increases, the population increases, this in turn increases the birthrate which is a function of the 
population and fractional birth rate.  Without intervention of some sort, the population will increase 
exponentially because there is nothing limiting the growth of the population.  This is known as a 
Reinforcing Loop, denoted by the R in the center.  (Figure 15) 
 
Figure 15:  Birth Rate
13
 
While the birth rate creates a reinforcing loop, exploding the population, we must also account for the 
death rate.  The death rate is a function of the population and the average lifetime of the population.  As 
the population increases, the death rate increases, and the population decreases more than it would 
normally decrease.  Balancing loops, denoted by the B, are known for their goal seeking behavior.  If the 
population is not added to in any manner, the loop will eventually reach zero.  (Figure 16) 
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Figure 16:  Death Rate
14
 
Combining these two loops creates a more interesting dynamic.  The population is affected by both the 
birth rate and death rate.  Each rate is in turn affected by the population.  This is a simple depiction of 
the dynamic complexity of the simplest feedback loops.  (Figure 17) 
 
Figure 17:  Population Model
15
 
Understanding policy resistance, dynamic complexity and the structure of causal loop diagrams allows 
for the interactions within the company and external drivers to the company to be modeled and 
analyzed.  This allows a better understanding of the higher-order effects within the system and allow for 
an enhanced ability to diagnose problems and develop policy which is more beneficial.  (Sterman, 2000) 
5.3 Dynamics of Soldier Welfare at the Company Level 
There is no single cause for high-risk soldiers and the occurrence of high-risk events.  There are multiple 
external factors in a soldier life which the Army and its leaders have no control of such as soldier 
upbringing and medical conditions.  At the same time, there are some elements which leaders can focus 
on to ensure the well-being of soldiers, and ultimately affect whether soldiers will participate in high-risk 
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activities.  Throughout the interviews and research a few trends quickly emerged.  Internal to the 
company, cohesion is a critical aspect of not only identification of soldier issues, but also prevention.  
Vertical cohesion leads to trust between the leader and the led.  Horizontal cohesion leads to soldiers 
supporting one another.  The conditions surrounding cohesion are complex and dynamic.  Additionally, 
there are exogenous inputs into the system which drive behavior.  The two major sources are the 
number of requirements placed on leaders at the company level and the quantitative, short-term 
incentive structure driving behaviors.  Leaders at the company level have little impact on the impacting 
these.   
5.3.1 Exogenous Variables 
In order to fully understand how the system operates, it is critical to first understand two of the primary 
exogenous variables which drive behaviors at the company level.  The first is the number of 
requirements at the company level.  With respect to soldier welfare, there are multiple programs which 
must be managed at the company level.  These are the programs associated with the whole soldier 
concept discussed in Chapter 2.  In addition to these programs, there are also a multitude of other tasks 
and requirements which must be completed.  This often leads to a time crunch at the company level due 
to the limited number of hours in a week.  A study in 2002 found that there is 256 available days for 
training after incorporating weekends, holidays, and other unavailable days.  It also found that there are 
297 days of directed training. (Wong, 2002)  While the requirements may not be exactly the over a 
decade later, the general lesson is the same.   
 
An additional driver of this perception is that leaders feel there is more time while deployed and “doing 
their job”.  This might be more of a function of time than number of tasks.  For example there are nearly 
three times as many hours for work related functions while deployed than in garrison.16  This time 
crunch forces individuals to make more efficient use of their time and prioritize what must be 
completed.  This leads to the neglect of tasks which are seen as unimportant or simply not checked on. 
The second major driver of behavior at the company level is the incentive structure.  Operational 
excellence and readiness is the primary driver of behavior.  Many feel that in order to be qualified as a 
good leader, you must have the data to back it up.  Evaluations and awards are littered with quantitative 
                                                          
16
 Garrison:  8 hours/day x 4.5 Days/Week x 48 Weeks/Year = 1,728 hours/year (Assumes 4 weeks of block leave 
per year, 5 day work week, and a four day weekend every month.)      
Deployed:  16 hours/day x 345 Days/Year = 5,520 Hours/Year (Assumes 20 days for R&R leave and potential for 16 
hour work days) 
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data judging how effective a leader is.  Some of these examples include number of rounds safely fired, 
number of safety violations, number of soldiers promoted, etc.  Therefore, a primary driver of individual 
behavior is to be able to quantitatively demonstrate things that were accomplished.  This is easy to do 
operationally.  This is far more difficult with respect to a more qualitative assessment of climate and 
morale.  It is much easier for a promotion board panel to judge a squad leader who ‘expertly led 500 
patrols in a highly contested area of operation’ than it is to judge a squad leader who ‘fostered a high 
level of esprit-de-corps’ in his squad.  Therefore, short-term, quantifiable, operational tasks will become 
prioritized, and tasks which are beneficial for the long-term viability of the Army, such as leadership 
development, are dropped off the calendar.   
5.3.2 Casual Loop Diagram 
Figure 18 is a graphical representation of the system described in the previous chapters.  The exogenous 
variables are outlined in red.  This model will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.   
 
Figure 18:  Causal Loop Model 
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5.3.3 Analysis of Causal Loop Diagram 
As requirements are increased and incentive structure is reinforced, more requirements are added and 
the perception that operational proficiency is essentially the only measure that matters for 
advancement, soldier well-being will continue to decline based on the structure of the system.  This may 
be mitigated by skilled individuals within the system, but structurally it puts leaders at a disadvantage 
from the start, often, unable to make the uphill climb towards success.  These two drivers force the 
system to adapt internally, and ultimately the unintended consequence of decreased soldier well-being 
enters into a series of negative reinforcing loops.   
 
The increase in requirements requires units to become more efficient with their time.  This ultimately 
leads the regimentation of actions in order to fit all requirements into the work week, often leaving little 
space for company commanders to have white space on their schedule.  Platoon and squad leaders are 
often left with even less white space.   This regimentation, ultimately leads to more work being 
assigned.  As work assigned increases, units become more efficient and regimented, as this occurs; there 
is more perceived time available for work, and more work assigned.  (Figure 19)  
 
 
Figure 19:  More Work Makes More Work 
 
As work increases and time decreases.  The natural response of the system is to take short cuts.  This is 
done through the prioritization of tasks and the elimination of tasks which are not checked up on or 
deemed as important.  (Figure 20) 
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Figure 20:  Prioritization of Work 
 
Combining the effects of dropping tasks to save time and the Army incentive structure which is 
quantitatively based and focused towards short-term objectives, there are specific tasks that are 
dropped or neglected.  One of the most critical tasks dropped are Leader Development tasks.  The 
benefits of leader development are often long-term improvements and not incentivized by the current 
structure.  Also, it is difficult to specifically attribute leader development to specific improvements. 
(Figure 21) 
 
 
Figure 21:  Leader Development Tasks 
 
The perceived unimportance of leader development tasks is reinforced each time tasks are skipped or 
ignored.  For example, one leader told a story how his commander said counseling was critical, 
demanded it was completed, but never provided time for leaders to complete it or to review the 
counseling for quality himself.  Leaders within the unit were often forced to complete counseling late on 
Fridays.  Ultimately, the system adapted which led to poor quality counseling and creative “pencil 
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whipping” to meet requirements.  The commander established a culture where counseling the number 
of counseling statements was checked on, but the quality was unimportant.  (Figure 22) 
 
 
Figure 22:  Culture of Leader Development 
 
This decrease in leader development combines with two other elements to decrease junior leader 
learning.  First, the increased regimentation of schedule as discussed above, limits leaders’ sense of 
autonomy.  Multiple leaders, from company commanders to squad leaders, lamented this perceived lack 
of mission command.  This is exacerbated by having a generation of junior leaders who feel they were 
most successful while deployed when mission command was utilized.  These leaders feel like task 
managers and not leaders.  This lack of the sense of autonomy limits leader’s ability to learn through 
experience.  They cannot craft the future of their units; they just manage someone else’s plan.  (Figure 
23) 
 
 
Figure 23:  Regimentation and Autonomy 
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Another effect of the requirement for efficiency is that multiple tools are utilized to assist leaders 
because of their lack of time and experience.  If leaders only use the tools as a checklist or task to be 
completed, their learning is limited, and their professional development is stunted.  (Figure 24) 
 
 
Figure 24:  Leader Tools 
 
 
Combining the overutilization of leader tools, the decreased autonomy, and lack of leader development 
training, junior leader learning has decreased, and therefore, the quality of junior leaders has decreased.  
Nearly every interviewee stated that junior leaders were promoted too early and are ill prepared for the 
challenges that these leaders face as the first line supervisors for the most at risk population.  While 
there will not likely be a need to rapidly promote leaders with the end of the war in Iraq, drawdown in 
Afghanistan, and the cutbacks of troop levels in the future, the other drivers previously discussed have 
not changed and leaders are still not being provided the training or experience to adequately develop to 
meet these challenges.  (Figure 25) 
 
 
Figure 25:  Diminished Learning 
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With the emergence of additional hours worked, regimentation, and the decrease of quality junior 
leaders, multiple vicious cycles materialize which lead to the continual decrease of soldier well-being.  
The first stems from the lack of autonomy.  As leaders lose autonomy, initiative dwindles.  This is likely 
perceived as a lack of motivation, and therefore regimentation must increase to ensure these individuals 
do what they are supposed to do.  This regimentation comes in the form of scheduling, reports, and 
other tools and trackers which consume leaders’ time.  (Figure 26) 
 
 
Figure 26:  Less Autonomy, More Regimentation 
 
One of the most significant impacts on the system is the diminished quality of junior leaders.  As the 
quality of junior leaders is depleted, they are less able to build a cohesive team.  This in turn diminishes 
horizontal cohesion and individual well-being.  This diminished well-being increases the likelihood of and 
number of incidents.  This then increases the perceived need for controls, which continues to reinforce 
the diminished quality of junior leaders.  This is a critical reinforcing loop because of the benefits of 
horizontal cohesion, as previously discussed.  This relationship between soldiers is critical.  Due to the 
difficulties of utilizing other soldiers as an identifier of high-risk behaviors or indicators, it is vital to have 
soldiers helping one another.  Therefore, the leader’s ability to develop a cohesive team is important for 
the soldier’s well-being, but also the support structure that naturally develops around the soldier.  Any 
information on high-risk soldiers from friends within the unit should be considered a bonus, and not the 
norm.  At the same time, the lack of leader development of these junior soldiers stunts their ability to 
provide assistance to their friends in need.  (Figure 27) 
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Figure 27:  Leadership and Horizontal Cohesion 
 
An additional effect of the diminished capability of junior leaders is the diminished vertical cohesion.  A 
reoccurring theme in many interviews is that in order to identify high-risk soldiers, is for the leader to 
develop a positive relationship with the soldier.  The benefits of vertical cohesion are two-fold.  First the 
link between vertical cohesion and individual well-being has been already discussed.  When the quality 
of junior leaders is diminished, a similar reinforcing look to the one depicted above occurs.  (Figure 28) 
 
 
Figure 28:  Leadership and Vertical Cohesion 
 
Vertical cohesion also allows the leader to better identify issues.  The leader is more likely know more 
details about the soldier, is more responsive to behavioral changes or cues identifying something is 
wrong with the soldier, and for the soldier to trust the leader to come forward with problems for 
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assistance.  As vertical cohesion is depleted due to diminished leader quality, another reinforcing loop is 
established.  A decrease in leader quality creates a decrease in vertical cohesion, this leads to a decrease 
in assistance provided because of challenges of identification described above as well as decreased 
leader ability to provide assistance.  This ultimately increases the incidents and continues to deplete the 
quality of leaders.  (Figure 29) 
 
 
Figure 29:  Vertical Cohesion, Identification and Mitigation 
Despite the positive effects of vertical cohesion on well-being, most leaders associated trust and the 
building of vertical cohesion primarily with the identification of high-risk soldiers, and not the 
prevention.  Therefore this is one of the most critical loops in describing the current system.  The current 
system incentivizes leaders to identify and mitigate, or “ID and pass”, as it will be referred to here.  
Many feel that if this occurs, they are no longer responsible for what the Soldier does.  It essentially 
‘gets it off the leader’s back.’   Some causes of this are the tools and trackers utilized, as well as the 
cultural disposition in which ‘the boss doesn’t like surprises’.   
 
First, the utilization of the SLLRT provides leaders plausible deniability for not identifying an issue.  If a 
leader asks a soldier all the questions, and the soldier does not provide full information, blame then falls 
on the soldier because the soldier was asked, but wasn’t honest.  Next, the utilization of the “High-Risk 
Matrix” provides leaders with additional coverage.  If they identified a soldier, and develop a plan of 
action for the soldier, they are no longer responsible, and the chain of command is not surprised by 
soldier involved in a high-risk event.  Finally, leaders realize they are not social workers, psychologists or 
financial advisors.  If they pass on the soldier to a professional, outside of the organization, the 
responsibility for assisting the individual is on the service provider.  While it is difficult to hold leaders 
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responsible for the actions outside of work for subordinates, the incentive structure drives the “identify 
and pass” phenomena described above.  Therefore, it is important to note that desire to build vertical 
cohesion is primarily based on being able to identify soldiers, not necessarily improve the well-being of 
soldiers.     
 
There is also a direct effect on the perceived need for controls which creates another two significant 
reinforcing loops.  Because leaders are not seen as capable, more directives come from higher to ensure 
they perform their job.  A good example of this is the SLRRT.  As mentioned earlier, there is a belief that 
there has been a diminishment of quality junior leaders, particularly with respect soldier welfare.  
Because of this, a majority of leaders understood and agreed with the utilization of the SLRRT as a tool 
to assist leaders.  Where they believed it has failed, is in the implementation.  For example, one 
commander felt it was mandatory to use and if it was not used and an incident occurred, he would be 
punished and labeled as a poor leader.   At this point, it is no longer a “tool” but a requirement.  Many 
leaders felt that it helps junior leaders, but more experienced leaders did not feel the tool added value, 
but were forced to use it anyway.  At the same time, leaders continue to have their sense of autonomy 
stripped.   Again, this relationship between the quality of junior leaders and the perceived need for 
controls continues to reinforce the depletion in the quality of junior leaders. (Figure 30) 
 
 
Figure 30:  Downward Drivers on Leader Quality 
 
As this regimentation continues, there is a perception of mistrust that forms between leader and led.  
For leaders who spent many of their formative years as leaders in a deployed environment, they have a 
clear picture of how they want to operate.  The complex nature of deployed operations forces senior 
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leaders to push decision making authority down to junior leaders and trust that they will make the right 
decisions based on their training level and situation specific knowledge.  They felt this method had led 
them to be successful and wish it continued in garrison, unfortunately most believe this is not the case.  
Many believe garrison is almost a polar opposite.  A simple example of the tension felt by company 
leaders came from a company commander in discussing the way physical training was performed in his 
brigade.  There was little flexibility in the time and location of physical training for this leader’s unit.  His 
perception was that while deployed, when lives were on the line, he was able to make decisions and 
command his unit, now in garrison, without lives on the line; he lacks the ability to adjust something as 
simple as adjusting the amount of time for physical training he feels his unit needs.  This leader 
attributed this to the brigade commander’s desire to control the unit and lack of trust in junior leaders 
to do the right thing.  Regardless of the brigade commander’s true intentions, but perception is reality, 
and the seeds of mistrust have been sown.  This in turn limits vertical cohesion within the organization. 
(Figure 31) 
 
 
Figure 31:  Perceptions of Trust and Cohesion 
 
Although vertical cohesion is critical in ensuring soldier well-being, it is also critical in identifying high-
risk soldiers.  The existence of the high-risk matrix as a tracking tool for leaders may act as a double edge 
sword.  On the positive side, it assists leaders, particularly company commanders and above, who have 
many soldiers with issues, to be able to easily track the problems soldiers have.  It also acts as a forcing 
mechanism for junior leaders to develop mitigation plans with these individuals.  At the same time it 
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creates a professional development opportunity through the use of high-risk team meetings to discuss 
and share mitigation strategies and share points of contact to external resources for leaders to direct 
soldiers to seek help.   
 
On the other hand, there are multiple potential ramifications of the high-risk matrix.  One example, 
provided by a First Sergeant, is that the terminology used “High-Risk Matrix” prevents soldiers from 
coming forward with problems.  A soldier who is performing admirably, but has some personal issues, 
does not want to be labeled as “High-Risk” when the soldier does not believe it is truly the case.  If the 
natural reaction to soldiers opening up about personal issues is to be labeled as high-risk, they will be 
less likely to come forward.  Despite much of the attention to reducing the stigma at the unit level, one 
of the primary mechanisms for managing high-risk soldiers is potentially one of the most significant 
drivers of the stigma.   
 
Additionally, the high-risk matrix creates an environment where vertical cohesion may be necessary at 
levels which are difficult to achieve.  For example, if a soldier is placed on the high-risk matrix, but his 
name is only provided to the company commander, there are only a few layers of vertical cohesion 
which is required (squad, platoon, and company).  Due to proximity and likelihood of contact this 
vertical cohesion is not difficult to achieve.  The soldier will be less likely to come forward if his name will 
be provided to the battalion, brigade, and division commanders on a high-risk matrix.  Regardless of the 
positive intentions of these leaders, it is extremely difficult to develop the personal relationships and 
vertical cohesion with individual soldiers and brigade and battalion level commanders due to the size of 
their respective units.   
 
Hours worked is influenced by multiple inputs.  First is simply the number of external requirements.  
Another is the number of incidents.  Another is the quality of leaders.  For example, a first sergeant can 
likely complete a counseling statement faster, and to a higher quality than a brand new squad leader.  
There is also a direct impact of hours worked on individual well-being and vertical cohesion.  (Figure 32) 
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Figure 32:  Hours Worked 
 
With this increase in hours worked, there is a direct impact on well-being.  If a soldier is spending 
excessive time at work, it decreases well-being.  The time at work is not the only critical aspect, but the 
utility of the work is also important.  Developing quality training for Soldiers to conduct is challenging.  
There are many resource limitations which require leaders to be creative in the development in training.  
For example, there are not an unlimited number of artillery rounds, but there are only so many times a 
cannon crewmember can simulate a dry fire mission on a howitzer before the training becomes stale.  In 
addition to this, the number of simulators is often limited or requires coordination and cannot be 
resourced quickly if there is some unscheduled downtime during the day.  Therefore, it is important for 
units not to overwork soldiers, but also ensure their work is seen as worthwhile of their time. 
 
In addition to this, there is a tension when balancing the need for leaders to perform their tasks with the 
requirements to keep soldiers gainfully employed.  Many leader tasks are not scheduled, preparing 
counseling, preparing for and resourcing training, and other administrative tasks.  Often leaders must 
accomplish these tasks while soldiers wait for them to be complete.  This frustrates both leaders and 
their soldiers.  Leaders often understand these frustrations, but feel obligated to keep soldiers at work 
until released by higher level leaders.  Ultimately, many leaders feel they must neglect their leader tasks 
and focus on keeping soldiers occupied, perform leader tasks at the detriment of keeping soldier’s 
gainfully employed, or keep soldier’s occupied during the workday, perform leader tasks at home, often 
sacrificing personal time and the leaders personal well-being.  The graph below shows a condensed 
version of these dynamics.  The relationships between incidents and diminished leader quality have 
already been provided.  (Figure 33) 
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Figure 33:  Reinforcement of Hours Worked 
 
The effect of the additional work has a direct impact on vertical cohesion as well, and leaders are put 
into a difficult situation with the continual flow of work and taskings.  One lieutenant discussed a 
company commander who was perceived as a “yes man”.  The perception was that this commander 
graciously accepted every his unit was provided.  This created the perception that he cared more about 
pleasing higher headquarters than taking care of the soldiers in his command.  Additionally, this created 
a rift between him and the first sergeant which was felt throughout the company.  This established a 
sense of mistrust by members of the unit with when dealing with the commander, decreasing vertical 
integration.  This loop is an additional loop added onto the structure above.  Again this continues to 
reinforce more work, decreased leader quality, and more work. (Figure 34) 
 
Figure 34:  Reinforcement of Hours Worked with Vertical Cohesion 
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The potential effects of this were highlighted by a first sergeant in while discussing the impact of 
weekend safety briefs on soldiers.  To soldiers, the commander discussed above will be viewed 
skeptically when providing his briefing to soldiers.  The soldiers would likely say something to the effect 
of, ‘If you really cared about my well-being on the weekends, why don’t you care how we’re treated 
from Monday through Friday?’  Whereas if the soldiers felt the commander truly cared, they would be 
more likely to internalize the safety brief.   
 
This puts the commander in a difficult position.  If the company commander appears to gladly accept 
every tasking, it will decrease vertical cohesion if soldiers feel the tasking are not worth their time and 
effort.  If the commander attempts to dispute being assigned the taskings but is unsuccessful, he can go 
back and support the higher headquarters to his company, potentially decreasing vertical cohesion at his 
level.  The other option is to come back to the company and blame higher headquarters.  The basic 
argument is ‘I tried to fight it (caring at company level), but there is nothing we can do to stop it, 
therefore we must execute (blame is now on higher headquarters)’.  This scenario reinforces the 
difficulties in dynamic discussed earlier with respect for the requirement for vertical cohesion equivalent 
to the level the high-risk matrix is provided to.  The company commander is put into a situation where 
he must sacrifice support for higher within his unit, in order to maintain vertical cohesion at the 
company level. 
 
These factors driving the decrease in individual well-being; work hours (excessive or perceived lack of 
value), vertical cohesion, and horizontal cohesion lead to decreased well-being and increased likelihood 
of incidents.  As incidents increase, the cycles discussed above are perpetuated.  Many leaders discussed 
the reactive nature to events at their units.  Once an event occurs regimentation increases such as 
mandatory SLLRT, professional development sessions, reports, and meetings with outside providers.  
This ultimately increases regimentation, which continues the cycle of decreased vertical and horizontal 
cohesion, to accompany decreased quality of junior leaders.   
5.4 Summary   
The structure of the system, in particularly, the overwhelming amount of requirements placed on 
leaders at the company level, and the incentive structure which stresses operational and quantitative 
success puts leaders at a structural disadvantage with respect to increasing soldier well-being and 
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minimizing high-risk incidents.  A common phrase when discussing the responsibilities of leaders is to 
‘set subordinates up for success’ and the current system is not allowing this to occur.   
 
Once the quality of junior leader’s decreases, the amount of work increases, and the schedule becomes 
more and more regimented, it begins a series of negative reinforcing feedback loops, ultimately 
decreasing soldier well-being and increasing the number of incidents.  Individual traits and abilities allow 
many leaders to overcome some of these problems, but these abilities are often learned through 
experience and training.  Junior leaders, who are the most critical link in ensuring the well-being of the 
most at-risk population of soldiers, are not being adequately prepared to do so.  At the same time, they 
are unable to learn because they are overwhelmed by the urgency of now.  Without addressing the root 
causes of these issues, the vicious cycles are likely to continue.  As they continue, the more solutions will 
be providing to address the issues, and the problems identified here will likely be exacerbated.   
 
Many of the effects of these loops can be mitigated by quality leaders at the company level, but some 
are out of the control of the company.  In particular, external requirements and the Army incentive 
structure are difficult, if not impossible, for company level leaders to have an impact on.  The 
recommendations in the following section will provide a series of recommendations with this nested 
structure in mind.  They will address the mechanics of leadership at the company level and the high level 
ecosystem in which the company operates in order to provide a conducive environment for leaders at 
the company to operate.   
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Chapter 6:  Recommendations 
In order to enhance soldier welfare, a holistic approach to the system and recommendations must be 
taken.  No company operates in a vacuum, and therefore is highly dependent upon the ecosystem it 
operates in.  Because of this, any recommendations must not only be provided at the company level, but 
also for the entities within the ecosystem, such as the brigade, battalion, and above.  Ultimately, whole 
soldier concept is highly dependent on the company.  The company in turn is highly dependent upon the 
battalion, brigade and Army policies.  These are three highly complex and nested systems.  Therefore, a 
series of holistic policy recommendations must be made in order to truly have the desired effect.  It is 
highly unlikely that changes at the company level will be successful without the support from battalion 
in above.  Therefore, there are two tiers of policy recommendations, first at the company level.  
Independently, these recommendations are not unique or novel, but regularly espoused procedures 
within the Army, that are often neglected.   Where the recommendations gain traction is through their 
combination.  The emergent properties integrated recommendations establish a comprehensive and 
manageable system operating within a supportive ecosystem.   
 
The remainder of this chapter will first discuss the overall strategy of the implementation of the whole 
soldier concept.  It will then provide recommendations at the company level to ensure soldier health 
and welfare.  The final but possibly most important series of recommendations focuses on the higher 
level solutions which provide the important contextual factors which drive and influence the behaviors 
at the company level.   
6.1 Current vs. Future State 
In the current state, the soldier welfare is a function of multiple factors, each creating the environment 
where the strategy is “Identify and Pass”.  There are a few multiple critical enterprise architecture 
elements responsible for this emergence.  They are primarily the organization, processes, knowledge, 
and infrastructure. (Nightingale & Rhodes, 2012).  A graphical depiction is shown below in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35:  Current State 
 
First and most importantly, the operational focus has dominated the Army for over a decade.  Soldiers 
have been deploying regularly over this time frame and therefore the organizational incentive structure 
has leaned toward deployed operations.  At the same time, the incentive structure is heavily dependent 
upon quantitative results in order demonstrate superiority.  Additionally, leaders have been incentivized 
not to “surprise the boss”.  This has created multiple effects.   First, it drives garrison leaders to focus on 
quantity over quality.  Therefore the amount of things accomplished is prioritized over the quality.  This 
is a natural reaction in order to compete with leaders in a deployed environment who have more time, 
and therefore, can do more work.  The incentives and garrison focus create processes which allow for 
more to be done at a faster rate.  Examples include the SLRRT which ensures all soldiers are asked 
critical questions, but does not truly address some of the underlying issues which created the tool, such 
as the leader inexperience.  At the same time, the infrastructure with multiple external services, allows 
for leaders to rapidly refer soldiers out to assistance.  Combining the organizational incentive structure, 
the processes, and the infrastructure, the Soldier welfare strategy of identify and pass is established.  
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Reinforcing this behavior is that the main area for organizational knowledge is on the job training, these 
processes and strategy build the knowledge base for leaders, which then reinforce the garrison focus of 
quality over quantity.   
 
In the recommended future state, the soldier welfare strategy is not a function of these elements, but a 
driver of these elements.  Soldier welfare is no longer separated from the operational focus, but is now 
integrated with.  With this new strategy in place, the organizations incentive structure will need to 
adapt, the processes will need to change and the infrastructure to be put in place in order to accomplish 
this.  At the same time, the knowledge is not only gained through experience, but it is also shared 
through leader development and training.  A visual depiction is provided in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36:  Future State 
 
The soldier welfare strategy needs to be prioritized structurally.  While some leaders lean in this 
direction naturally, others are consumed by the environment and the previous strategy of “Identify and 
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Pass” is perpetuated.  In the future state, the operational strategy and welfare strategy remain constant.  
There is no longer delineation between garrison and deployed operations.  Ultimately the end states of 
both are the same, achievement of operational objectives based on the units ability to function 
collectively, supported by soldier readiness.  With this being said, there must be an understanding that 
garrison operations cannot compete with deployed operations within the readiness strategy which 
much be supported by, but not driven by the organizational incentives.  It is physically impossible for 
garrison leaders to compete with deployed leaders on an operational level, and therefore objectives in 
garrison must be judged not only by quantity, but also by quality, this includes soldier welfare indicators.   
 
Ultimately the combination of the operational strategy and soldier welfare strategy creates the 
Readiness Strategy.    This strategy then drives the incentives as just discussed, the processes such as 
predictable realistic training, enhanced leader development, and specifically tailored processes at the 
unit and individual level because of an enhanced autonomy provided by levels above the company.  
These processes are supported by the infrastructure, which is designed to support the strategy.  Finally, 
knowledge is developed through leader development programs and on the job training.  This supports 
and reinforces the readiness strategy.  In short, the Army must force itself to slow down, take a balanced 
approach and focus on quality over quantity.     
6.2 Recommendations  
The recommendations within this section are interrelated.  The first series of recommendations are the 
major drivers of behaviors at the company level.  These focus the establishment of cohesion, the 
identification with the group, acceptance of Army Values as cultural norms, and the enforcement of 
standards at the company level.  Essentially, this is a true return to the basics of leadership, or 
Leadership 101.  While these recommendations may seem obvious, it’s just as important that the 
following series of recommendations are implemented in conjunction with the first series.  The second 
series of recommendations are the supporting recommendations in order to ensure the primary series 
of recommendations can occur.  Implementing the first series of recommendations will likely be futile 
without other structural changes to the system at the company level which support the first series.   
 
Finally, it must be always be remembered that the company level operates in a far larger contextual 
ecosystem, and is a product of its environment.  Therefore the final series of recommendations provide 
the requisite changes to be made to units at the battalion level and above in order to provide the 
supportive environment the company needs to enact both the primary and supporting 
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recommendations.  A graphical depiction is provided in Figure 37 and an overview of these programs 
provided below in Table 3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37:  Supporting Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1 
Primary  
Company Level 
Recommendations 
6.2.2 
Supporting Company Level 
Recommendations  
6.2.3 
Supporting Recommendations for Levels 
above the Company 
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Table 3:  List of Recommendations 
 
6.2.1 Major Recommendations for Company Level 
Below is a graphical depiction of the major policy recommendations at the company level for the 
prevention of high-risk soldiers and events in .  The policy recommendations (Blue) are developed to 
enhance positive behaviors (Orange).  Ideally, leaders and soldiers remain disciplined due to the 
acceptance of group norms and enforcement of standards.  A more detailed description is provided 
below.   
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Figure 38:  Major Company Level Recommendations 
Implementation of Formal Leader Development Program at Company Level (Process): 
 With the new focus on prevention, there needs to be a renewed focus on leader development training 
at the company level.  The 2012 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) 
Report found that only 35% of leaders had a favorable rating that their unit places a high priority on 
leader development.  Only 25% of leaders felt the leader development program at the company level 
had a large or great impact on their development.  The implementation of a formal leader development 
program has multiple benefits.  It increases the ability of leaders in the unit in the short term and long 
term.  Better leaders will develop and more beneficial training.  Additionally, an increase in leader 
abilities has been found to lead to an increase in both cohesion and discipline in the CASAL Report.  
Second, establish a culture where leader development is seen as important.  Additionally, it assists in 
identification and mitigation.  Leaders will be able to more readily identify issues due to training.  
Additionally, the enhanced cohesion makes leader identification more likely, but also soldiers are more 
likely to come forward.  At the same time, the increase in leader development makes it easier for 
leaders to mitigate locally or refer to support services.  If leader development is more regular, any 
reactions following an event will not be seen as cynically as overreactions, but as an ongoing process of 
leader development.   
 
96 
 
Dedication of Resources to Leader Tasks and Preparation (Process) 
There is limited time dedicated to leaders to perform their leader specific tasks, particularly at the squad 
level.  For example, the Army’s difficulties in ensuring quality counseling are documented (Riley, Conrad, 
& Keller-Glaze, 2012), but many leaders interviewed said time provided in the training schedule to 
conduct counseling.  While it is important to dedicate time to counseling, leaders also need the time to 
prepare quality counseling.  One squad leader estimated that it would take a few hours to develop 
quality counseling.  If no time is provided in the schedule, leaders must do it at home.  This may or may 
not occur, or it may cause issues in the leader’s personal life.   
 
Provide “Predictable Realistic” Training to Soldiers (Process) 
In an interview, one Captain stated that “In a perfect world there would be training everyday”.  This is 
not always the case.  A first sergeant stated that the best thing to do for soldiers is to provide them 
“Predictable, Realistic Training” because most soldiers joined the Army for that specific reason.  This 
cannot be achieved without the dedication of resources to leader tasks and leader development 
training.  The first expectation of soldiers is predictability.  If training is on the schedule, and soldier 
arrives in the morning with the expectation of training, there is a detrimental effect on the cohesion 
within the unit.  The soldier has the perception that the unit and by default, leaders, are not competent 
enough to plan and execute training according to the schedule.  It also enhances soldier frustration if 
they spent time outside of work preparing for an event that does not occur.  At the same time, realistic 
training is also a requirement.  If soldiers do not receive realistic training, they again will feel their time 
was wasted which diminishes well-being and cohesion. 
 
Army Values Training (Process) 
The benefits of cohesion on soldier welfare have been discussed, but as cohesion is built through the 
recommendations stated above, individual begin to identify with the group more.  As they identify with 
the group, they are more likely to accept group norms and individual norms (Identity Conferring).  
Therefore it is critical to reinforce the Army Values as the primary set of values in which professional 
soldiers live their lives.  This training is likely to need to be scenario based, or case studies, allowing 
soldiers to think critically about the application of the Army Values to a scenario as opposed to rote 
memorization of the acronym LDRSHIP and definitions of each value.  There are multiple benefits to this 
approach.  First it reinforces the Army Values in leaders who will be providing the training.  Next, it 
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aligns Army expectations and leader expectations for the behaviors of subordinates.  Finally, it begins 
the inculcation of values of junior soldiers at an early level.   
 
Enforcement of Standards (Process) 
For individuals who do not identify with the group, there must be the expectation that standards will be 
enforced when regulations or requirements are not met.  This did not seem to be a concern during the 
interviews, additionally; this was one of the highest rated leader behaviors in the CASAL study.  
Therefore, the current behaviors must be continued and reinforced.   
6.2.2 Supporting Recommendations at the Company Level 
 
Supporting Recommendations for Prevention at Company Level 
 
 Ensure a Balanced Leader Development Approach (Knowledge):  Ensure that leader 
development training is not only process focused, but leader skill and attribute focused.  It is 
true that leaders must learn how certain processes work (Filling out counseling form, etc.), but it 
also critical that leader development focuses on attributes such as empathy, innovation, and 
interpersonal tact.   
 
 Soldier Care Team Meetings (Process):  Leaders who engaged in High-Risk Team meetings 
discussed their benefit. Most meetings seemed to take place at the Battalion level, leaving 
junior leaders at the company level out of the loop.    It is a developmental session which brings 
leaders within the company together as an opportunity for organizational learning.  The 
command team can establish expectations and provide feedback to leaders.  Leaders can discuss 
solutions and share resources with one another. 
 
 Adjustment of Understanding of Mentoring (Knowledge):  Research has shown that within the 
Army there is a gap between what leaders think mentoring entails and the expectations of 
mentors from those they mentor.  Mentors see their role as a job coach.  Some of these 
activities include providing feedback on performance, teaching job skills, and developing skills 
for future positions.    Mentees also expect to be personally developed, which includes acting as 
a role model, demonstration of trust, provision of moral guidance, etc. and career sponsorship 
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to assist in the advancement of career.  Leaders must be made aware of this and adapt 
behaviors to become better sponsors.  (Steinberg & Foley, 1999) 
 
 Regular Sensing Sessions (Process):  Leaders must gauge the emotions of their units.  One of the 
best ways to do this is through sensing sessions.  This demonstrates to subordinates that the 
leadership cares, and gives leadership more visibility on the concerns within their unit. 
 
 Changes Based on Feedback (Process):  While sensing sessions are important to leaders and 
subordinates, there must be action based on feedback.  Any initial goodwill formed by the 
conduct of sensing sessions is replaced with frustration if no actions are taken on legitimate 
concerns.  It is important for the leader to be able separate the signal from the noise in these 
sessions and make changes based on the signals.   
 
 Hold Leaders Accountable (Organization):  While each situation is unique and treated 
differently, there must be fairness when dealing with the indiscretions of Officers, NCOs and 
Soldiers.  At the same time, leaders should be expected to behave at a higher standard due to 
their position as well as time in the service.  If there is an enhanced focus on the Army Values, 
leaders must be held to these standards.  The easiest example is “toxic” leaders.  Many of these 
leaders are considered “toxic” because of their lack of respect for others (failure to live Army 
Values).  This must be accounted when judging leaders despite any operational excellence they 
achieve.   
 
 Family Outreach (Process):  It is important that family members begin to identify themselves 
with the unit.  Due to this, leaders must proactively engage family members, foster two way 
communications, and provide accurate information to eliminate uncertainty for families.   
 
 Reception Program (Process):  One of the most critical yet overlooked aspects of soldier welfare 
is the reception program at the company level.  There are multiple uncertainties when an 
individual arrives to the unit.  The faster the process of integration and identification with the 
unit for a new soldier, the less likely there is a problem to develop. 
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 Information Gathering (Information):  While leader handoffs are typical when an individual 
moves within a unit, they are far less likely to occur outside of a unit.  When an individual leaves 
a unit, leaders must make an effort to make contact with the gaining unit to provide 
information.  At the same time, leaders must attempt to gather information from the previous 
unit.  The large problems (UCMJ Actions) are less likely to slip through the cracks than the 
smaller ones (Repetitive notices from bill collectors).   
 
 Team Formation Considerations (Organization):  Leaders must consider the personalities and 
situations surrounding members of the unit when assigning teams.  From the combination of 
Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant to the assignment of a new soldier to the unit who is 
having marital issues, it is important to ensure personalities, situations and skillsets are 
complimentary.   
 
Supporting Recommendations for Identification at Company Level 
 
 Elimination of SLLRT use during counseling (Knowledge):  A counseling session should not feel 
like an interrogation.  The SLLRT should be utilized during the preparation period for a 
counseling statement and not as a checklist during the counseling.  The SLLRT substitutes for 
counseling preparation which should not be the case.   
 
 Elimination of “High-Risk Matrix” (Information):  The existence of the high-risk matrix drives 
multiple behaviors.  First it creates list of the “problem children”.  No soldier wants to be placed 
on that list and it could possibly prevent soldiers from coming forward with assistance.  Instead 
of having a roster to report high-risk soldiers, this should be accomplished as a discussion as part 
of the “Soldier Care” meeting among leaders and one on one conversation between leaders to 
protect the privacy of soldiers.  The matrix becomes the method of communication instead of a 
discussion, which should not be the case.   
 
Supporting Recommendations for Mitigation at Company Level  
 
 Ensure Leader Follow-Up (Process):  As discussed earlier, many leaders assume the soldiers 
problems are being taken care of once referred to a service provider.  In order to ensure no 
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soldier slips through the cracks, leaders should follow up with providers to ensure soldiers are 
making progress, with the understanding not all information can be passed due to HIPPA 
requirements.   
  
Supporting Recommendations for Response at Company Level 
 
 If Soldier Not Identified, Determine Why (Organization):  Leadership needs to identify the root 
causes of failed identification and not focus on the surprise of a soldier committing an act that 
was not identified.  Did the soldier just make a poor decision; did toxic leadership prevent a 
soldier from coming forward to help, etc.?    
 
 Take Measured Action Following an Event (Process):  Post-event learning should take place, but 
leaders need to avoid overreacting.  If this occurs, soldiers in the company may become more 
focused on the response than the learning involved in the response.   
 
 Engage Junior Leaders During Response (Organization):  The commander and first sergeant 
naturally get involved to a high level than normal post event.  Company level leaders must 
ensure they do not completely cut out junior leaders.  They need to remain involved because 
the soldier will eventually return to their unit and there is a learning to occur following an event.   
6.2.3 Higher Level Recommendations 
 
 Focus on How to Perform Leader Development Training (Knowledge):  To accompany the 
recommendation at the company level to provide balanced leader training, the Army needs to 
ensure leaders understand how to develop and conduct quality leader development training.   
 
 Development of Case Studies (Knowledge):  Leader development training and Army Values 
training will require resources which may not be possible to develop at the company level.  For 
example, if vignettes or case studies are to be used, it may be difficult to create at the company 
level.  On the other hand, the Army can develop case studies based on real scenarios.  A robust 
library of resources for company level leaders to access and utilize to train their units.   
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 More Flexibility in Scheduling (Process):  Without the ability to manage their own schedule, it is 
unlikely for commanders to be able to adequately perform these tasks.  Leaders need to be 
trusted and provided autonomy to truly lead their units.  At the same time, an analysis of 
requirements must be conducted to identify what units do truly provide value and others that 
are redundant and can be cancelled.   
 
 Review of Soldier Welfare Programs (Process):  There are too many programs and not enough 
time for leaders to manage.  This has created a check the block mentality for these programs 
where quantity of programs is prioritized over quality of programs.  Instead of analyzing what 
programs to cut, a blank slate exercise should be conducted, beginning with Army Values 
training.  Then programs can be added if they cannot be covered through Army Values training.   
 
 Incentive Structure (Organization):  While the Army has identified that the operational culture 
has taken over since operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began, the underlying incentive 
structure is still quite similar.  Quantitative assessments are still extremely important, and it is 
difficult to quantify many of these recommended tasks.  At the same time, many of the benefits 
of these programs are difficult to identify (i.e. Cohesion and Army Values Training) or have long-
term benefits which may not prove to be immediately beneficial (Army Values Training) 
 
 Make the 360 Degree Assessment Count (Organization):  Being that it is difficult to measure 
things such as cohesion and command climate, the 360 Degree Assessment should no longer be 
solely utilized as a tool, but as a mechanism which impacts the evaluation of the leader.  It 
forces the leader to consider not only the needs of his supervisor, but also the needs of his 
subordinates.  It gives subordinates a voice in the evaluation process, which will make it more 
easy to identify “toxic” leaders who execute at the expense of their subordinates.  Again it will 
be up to evaluators to separate the signal from the noise in these reviews.  (Kane, 2012) 
 
 Less Centralized and Flexible Human Resources Strategy (Organization):  Company level 
leaders should have some say in the manning of their organization.  This is necessary if junior 
level leaders are to be provided more autonomy.  If a leader is not adequate and able to correct 
the deficiencies, a unit should not be saddled the leader.  It creates two issues, first, it decreases 
cohesion within the unit because the rest of leadership loses credibility, and it keeps the 
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position from being backfilled with a more competent leader.   A more free market approach, 
similar to what was presented in the book, Bleeding Talent, could prove to be beneficial in the 
long run.  ( Kane, 2012)  Company leadership has often has no say in the soldiers or leaders 
assigned.  They also have difficulties removing leaders who are not meeting the established 
standards.  A process where leaders can hire and fire on their own could be beneficial.  
Successful leaders would never be without a position, leaders would be incentivized to foster a 
positive command climate in order to attract talented leaders, or talented leaders would search 
for challenges in order to prove their worth. 
 
 Protect Training (Process):  Leaders are frustrated because they do not feel their training is 
protected and feel they are constantly hit with last minute taskings.  If the units above the 
company level demand schedules submit to and follow training schedules, the agreement 
should be mutual.  Companies do as they say and battalion and above allow the company to 
execute.  If this impossible, units should go back to training cycles.  Units, who are assigned as 
red, are responsible for the execution of taskings and the other units are protected.  This at least 
provides certainty.  The without protections the current system does not allow companies to do 
anything well when taskings appear.   
 
 Unit Centric Barracks (Infrastructure):  Since IMCOM manages barracks, units no longer are 
responsible.  Units should be provided a block of barracks in a similar area to aid in allowing 
leaders to check.  If a unit wants to conduct a surprise health and welfare inspection and they 
have soldiers spread amongst multiple buildings across post, it is extremely difficult to secure 
and conduct these inspections in a timely manner.   
 
 Soldier Welfare is a Continuous Process (Process):  One leader provided a story on how his 
brigade commander created a two-week soldier welfare period in the brigade.  Training was 
minimized and there was an expectation for leaders to catch up on soldier welfare tasks.  This is 
beneficial if it allowed everyone to get caught up and then continually reinforced on the training 
schedule.   If it was a one-time thing, it creates a cultural norm that soldier welfare is separate 
and it’s only a priority if we fall behind.  At the same time, taking two weeks out of the schedule 
pushed back other requirements and created a backlog of work, causing issues on the back end 
once work continued.   
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 Foster Innovation (Knowledge):  One of the effects of the regimented scheduling is the stifling 
of initiative (Wong, 2002).  To accompany the increased flexibility, leaders must be rewarded for 
showing initiative, even if not successful.  As innovation spreads, it is important to capture some 
of these best practices and spread those utilizing organizations already in place such as the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned.   
 
 Enhanced Screening (Organization):  This recommendation is outside of the unit level, and more 
focused on accessions.  Many high-risk soldiers enter the Army with a series of issues already in 
place.  Additional screening methods should be implemented, either during their recruitment or 
at worst case, basic training.   
 
 Additional Computers at the Company Level (Infrastructure):  With most programs online, 
there is a dearth of computers at the company level.  There are often one or two computers at 
the platoon level for all soldiers to use.  For any process which involves multiple soldiers to get 
on the computer, it cannot be done at the company.  Leaders can send soldiers to the education 
center or to their rooms to utilize personal computers.  If the Army cannot provide each 
individual computers for budgetary purposes it is understood, but it should consider allowing for 
soldiers to access the network through wi-fi at work, obviously utilizing certificates and security 
measures.   
 
 Leader Management Software (Infrastructure):  The Digital Training Management System is 
utilized to track soldier training records.  The methods to track high-risk soldiers are far less 
robust.  There are often Excel spreadsheets and PowerPoint slides utilized to track this 
information.  If soldiers’ details will be tracked, a more secure system should be utilized, which 
allows leaders to transfer information and connect with one another as discussed at the 
company level.  Additionally, service providers can update this system as well to allow leaders to 
track progress in things such as financial management training.   
 
 Additional Training Simulators (Infrastructure):  As budget cutbacks continue, one of the most 
difficult of the primary recommendations to achieve will be “Predictable, Realistic Training”.  For 
example, artillery rounds are expensive and will be more difficult to acquire for training.  At the 
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same time, the need for quality training will be as important as ever.  If the Army can invest in 
simulators for soldiers, these are renewable training resources that are as close to the real 
training as possible.  There are other benefits to simulation as well such as reduced wear and 
tear on equipment which decreases maintenance costs and the relative ease for leaders to 
initiate and begin training on a simulator.  If a unit has unexpected free time and easy access to 
a simulator, the leader can quickly move to the simulator and begin training.   
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
7.1 Health and Welfare of the Force 
The requirement to ensure the health and discipline of the force has never changed.  They are vital 
components to the readiness of the Army and national security.  At the same, the circumstances 
surrounding the Army at this time are unique.  This is the first time the all-volunteer force has reset from 
over a decade of continuous combat operations.  At the same time, the size of the force is decreasing as 
budgetary constraints emerge.  Due to this, it is increasingly important that this personnel reset is done 
correctly.  The Army needs to ensure its population of seasoned combat veterans is taken care of, the 
new generation of soldiers is adequately developed, many without the seasoning of combat, and the 
Army is able to retain its talent as the size of the force dwindles.   
 
While there are larger trends with respect to the health and discipline of the force, the specific challenge 
facing each soldier and leader are unique to the individuals involved and their environment.  Some 
problems are unpreventable, such as depression, some are event based, such as mTBI, and others 
accumulate and develop over time, such as job related stress.  This creates a situation where leaders 
cannot prevent all issues from impacting a soldier, but it does not mean the actions of the leader do not 
have an impact.  The ability of leaders to prevent the preventable or limit, identify, and assist in the 
mitigation of the unpreventable is a critical skill.  The key is for the Army to develop leaders and create 
an environment where leaders understand the impact of their actions in a holistic manner and to 
provide a context in which these abilities flourish.   
 
Leaders must never forget how critical the ability to grow from within is to the Army.  The Army is 
unique in that all of its leaders are homegrown.  The most junior private or lieutenant in the Army may 
be the Sergeant Major of the Army or the Army Chief of Staff someday.  General Electric can always hire 
officers from the Army, but the Army cannot hire managers away from General Electric.  Therefore it is 
critical to ensure soldiers are cared for and leaders are developed in order to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of the Army as an elite military force.  At the most elemental level, this begins with 
ensuring the health and welfare of the force.   
7.2 Cookie Cutter Solutions to Individual Problems  
At the macro level, leaders across the Army have identified that priorities have skewed toward 
operational readiness.  This is a natural reaction to over a decade of combat.  This would create a shift in 
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even the most stagnant bureaucracies.  Now that combat operations are dwindling, the Army has a 
whole is having problems readjusting to the new realities and returning to equilibrium. 
At the same time, adaptability and flexibility have been two of the trademark qualities of leaders and 
soldiers at the lowest levels over the past decade.  Soldiers who were trained for tank warfare have 
become diplomats and artillerymen have led civil reconstruction efforts.  This shift nearly happened 
overnight.  This demonstrates the capacity for change at the lowest levels within the Army but may 
cause these individuals to become victims of their own successes.   
 
These two realities have created an environment of quick fixes.  The bureaucratic side of the Army 
realizes that there has been a shift, and therefore reacted with a series of programs and tools to address 
the perceived problems, hoping it eventually creates a shift away from the operational focus.  Leaders at 
the lowest level are then expected to execute these tasks with the assumption that they will address the 
problem and create a shift in the culture.  While this may be somewhat true, many of these tasks don’t 
address the root causes of the many of these problems.  For example, the SLRRT was developed to 
address the perceived inexperience of junior level leaders.  The tool assumes that leaders will become 
more proficient in counseling with the utilization of the tool and it becomes culturally ingrained.  This is 
not limited to soldier welfare tasks.  While this assists the inexperienced leader, little is done to address 
the root cause of the need for the SLRRT, which are the inexperienced leaders at the unit level.   
 
Professional development at the company level and the oversight of soldier welfare have been turned 
into a series of check the block taskings due to resource constraints and the incentive structure.   
Like many large bureaucracies, the Army can easily implement new programs but it is much harder to 
take them away.  Anyone can rationalize the existence of every of the whole soldier concept programs 
identified in section two, and therefore, it is much harder to make cuts.  At the same time, new 
programs regularly added on top of the previous series of programs.  This can be seen with the 
emergence of resiliency training, the SLRRT and High-Risk Matrices.  Ultimately, these tasks have 
become an independent series of tasks and not a holistic approach to soldier welfare in the minds of 
many leaders. 
 
At the same time the highly adaptable leaders ensure mission accomplishment.  They will ensure all 
requirements are met.  This is partially driven by the cultural expectation of mission accomplishment, 
but also by the incentive structure which incentivizes quantity over quality.  Therefore leaders will 
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sacrifice quality over quantity.  Additionally, leaders consumed with the urgency of the now, and short-
term successes are incentivized over long term successes.  Reporting a task is complete is a short-term 
success, the quality of a leader development program is a long-term success, which is not able to be 
tracked, and therefore, the short-term processes win out.   
 
The effects of these targeted fixes at the Army level combined with the culture at the company level 
rooted in mission accomplishment creates an environment where standardization has overwhelmed a 
highly personalized process.  No two soldier issues are identical and targeted solutions need to be 
developed by individuals with direct and specific knowledge of the particular situation.  Leaders are not 
incentivized to determine a specific course of action, unique to the soldier’s situation.  They are 
incentivized to identify issues and pass the soldier to a service provider.     
 
The Army needs to focus on the establishment of the underlying cultural and knowledge drivers and not 
attempt force specific leader processes.  Using the SLRRT as the example, the Army should not tell a 
leader what questions to ask but provide a leader with the understanding of the expectations of leaders, 
the inculcation of cultural values, the ability to develop tailored solutions for soldiers, and the 
knowledge of resources available for assistance.  This requires more than just the introduction of a tool 
that becomes a checklist.  It requires a holistic approach, with multiple changes in not only processes 
but a shift in strategy accompanied by changes in processes, infrastructure and incentives to support the 
strategy.  
 
7.3 It’s Everyone Else’s Fault  
At the micro level, individuals need to work towards common goals.  Leaders at all levels suffer from 
fundamental attribution error.  It is always someone else’s fault or responsibility.  Above the company 
level, the problem is seen as a failure by junior leaders who don’t understand garrison operations.  Their 
solutions are filled with “back in the day” stories of how the Army used to be.  Solutions to deal with this 
lack of “garrison leadership” are usually tasks to accomplish and not attitudes and behaviors to learn 
and internalize.  As described earlier, the red book included drug testing, safety inspections, drill and 
ceremony and accountability formations.  These hardly address the underlying issues such as the failure 
to systematically develop cohesion, caring leaders, and professional soldiers adhering to the Army 
Values.  Many leaders who have spent their entire careers in a combat centric Army understand how 
these are important supporting tasks to maintain discipline, but are hardly seen as directly responsible 
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for the units ability to fight and win the nations wars and build cohesion between the leader and led.  
Ultimately there needs to be a shift by senior leaders to recognize that the “good old days” are not 
returning and a hybrid model must be developed;  one that seamlessly integrates these supporting tasks 
with the high-quality, realistic training, that soldiers have come to expect in over a decade of combat 
operations.  There are not enough hours in a day to do both successfully.   
 
At the same time, company level leaders must look internally as well.  They see “higher” as the issue 
because they do not feel as if they have control of their units and are out of touch.  It is also easy to 
place blame on the individual soldier.  Leaders can rationalize their efforts following a high-risk event by 
a subordinate by saying, “I can’t control what soldiers do in their free time.  He made his own decisions.”  
While both of these are contributing factors, there is likely something the leader could have done.  The 
leader could have prioritized and managed time better, regardless of the requirements placed on by 
higher headquarters.  It is also possible that the leader could have done better establishing vertical and 
horizontal cohesion within the unit.  The construct of the current system reinforces this.  If leaders do 
exactly what is told to them, the SLRRT for example, and identify the soldier, and pass the individual to a 
service provider, their job is done.  This creates a paper trail, essentially abdicating the leader of 
responsibly for the soldier’s actions.  Until company level leaders are held responsible for and 
incentivized based on the climate and cohesion within their organizations, the Army will always be in the 
reactive mode, waiting for soldiers issues to arise and then address the problem.   
 
Individual soldiers to not absent responsibility as well.  These are adults, responsible for their own 
decisions.  The easiest thing for a soldier to do following an event is to blame “the Army” for their 
problems or their personal failures.  While this may or may not be the case, the Army plays such a large 
role in these soldiers’ lives it is nearly impossible for there not to be an impact.  Therefore, it is critical 
for leaders at the company level to foster soldier inclusiveness to the group and spread positive cultural 
norms associated aligned with the Army Values.  It is up to “big Army” to set the conditions for this to 
occur.   
 
Ultimately, the Army must do a better job reconciling the leader’s responsibility of “taking care of 
soldiers” and the personal responsibility of the individual to “do the right thing”.  If leaders become too 
involved, leaders may be viewed as intrusive and elicit resistance from their soldiers.  These leaders 
have to ensure that the mission is being successfully accomplished in parallel with individual soldier 
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well-being. Similarly, soldiers must be held responsible for their actions, but the impacts a leader has 
should be considered.  If soldiers are solely held responsible and there are no implications on the leader, 
the leader has the opportunity to abdicate responsibility.  Soldiers must internalize the Army norms and 
ensure basic standards of discipline are met.  Company level leaders must establish a supportive 
environment and cohesive teams.  Finally, senior leaders must ensure company level leaders are 
prepared to encounter unique challenges and provided the opportunity to be successful.  Therefore all 
three layers need to work together. 
7.4 Enacting Change 
The basic principles of leadership remain constant.  There is no ADP 6-22 or FM 6-22 for deployed 
operations and ADP 6-22 or FM 6-22 for garrison operations.  Leadership is leadership.   The difference 
between deployed operations and garrison operations is the context surrounding leadership.  One of the 
biggest questions asked during this research is “how do you make leaders to care?”  The easy answer is 
you can’t.  The better answer is the same way you make leaders care in combat.  Leaders are provided 
meaningful work, the autonomy to accomplish it, held responsible for their unit and for their 
subordinates and cohesion is fostered at the unit level though mutual trust and support though day to 
day operations.  If it works in combat, it will work in garrison.  The challenge in garrison is that there is 
only eight hours a day to achieve it.  Therefore, senior leaders must set the conditions for success and 
company level leaders must execute when given the opportunity.  
  
You often hear leaders in the Army say it must “get back to the basics”.  “Getting back to the basics” is 
not the accomplishment of a series of disciplinary tasks such as health and welfare inspections and 
conducting regular urinalysis.  “Getting back to the basics” is conducting quality training, maintaining 
standards, and growing and developing professional soldiers and leaders to ensure the short-term 
success and the long-term viability of the Army.     
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Appendix A (Army Values) 
Loyalty - Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit and other Soldiers.  
Duty - Fulfill your obligations.  
Respect - Treat people as they should be treated.  
Selfless Service - Put the welfare of the nation, the Army and your subordinates before your own.  
Honor - Live up to Army values.  
Integrity - Do what’s right, legally and morally.  
Personal Courage - Face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral) 
http://www.army.mil/values/ 
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Appendix B (Troop Leading Procedures) 
 
http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/moxiepix/b1_3303.gif 
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Appendix C (Army Health Promotion Requirements of Commanders) 
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Appendix D (List of External Services) 
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Appendix E (Soldier Leader Risk Reduction Tool) 
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Appendix F (Example Training Schedule) 
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